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Under weak contract enforcement the trading parties’ trust, defined as 
their belief in other’s trustworthiness, appears important for realizing 
gains from trade. In contrast, under strong contract enforcement beliefs 
about other’s trustworthiness appear less important, suggesting that trust 
and contract enforcement are substitutes. Here we show, however, that 
trust and contract enforcement can be complements, and identify the key 
mechanisms that drives this complementarity. We demonstrate that 
under weak contract enforcement trust has no effect on gains from trade, 
but when we successively improve contract enforcement, larger effects 
of trust emerge. Likewise, improvements in contract enforcement lead to 
no increases in gains from trade under low initial trust, but generate high 
increases in gains from trade when initial trust is high. We identify three 
key mechanisms: (1) heterogeneity in trustworthiness; (2) strength of 
contract enforcement affecting the ability to elicit reciprocal behavior 
from trustworthy types, and screen out untrustworthy types; (3) trust 
beliefs determining willingness to try such strategies. 
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Incomplete and imperfectly enforceable agreements are ubiquitous in economic life. Informational 
constraints render it impossible in many cases to govern all conceivable contingencies in a contract 
and to verify all enforcement-relevant information. Moreover, weak judicial systems render it 
infeasible or extremely costly in many countries to enforce contractual promises even when 
informational constraints are not binding.1 The contracting parties are therefore exposed to the 
threat of being cheated and they may only be willing to interact and realize the associated gains 
from trade if they trust that the other party will not take advantage of them. It has therefore been 
argued that trust is of fundamental importance for achieving economic efficiency (see, e.g., 
Banfield, 1958; Arrow, 1972; Coleman, 1990; Putnam, 1993, 2000; Fukuyama, 1995). The scope 
for trust to shape economic outcomes appears broad. Trust can affect individual-level economic 
interactions, the efficiency of organizations, the functioning of entire markets, and even economic 
development and growth at the country level.   
It is quite evident that trust, which we define in this paper as people’s beliefs in the 
trustworthiness of others, matters when contracts are incomplete or imperfectly enforceable. It is, 
however, less clear and to the best of our knowledge an unstudied question whether trust and 
contract enforcement are substitutes or complements for the realization of gains from trade. 
Depending on the answer to this question, fundamentally distinct policy implications result. In this 
paper, we study experimentally and theoretically the nature of the interaction of trust and contract 
enforcement.  
Intuitively, trust appears to be more important in environments with lower contract 
enforcement because the scope for cheating on the trading partner is higher. Therefore, more trust 
is required to initiate or execute a trade. Thus, if both trust and contract enforcement are causal 
factors in the realization of gains from trade, it appears that a lower level of trust can be 
compensated for by a higher level of contract enforcement, and vice versa, to achieve a given 
realization of gains from trade. In other words, trust and contract enforcement would be substitutes 
that can be varied independently to increase the realization of gains from trade. If this were true, 
                                                 
1 Djankov et al. (2008)—who study debt enforcement in 88 countries around the globe—report, 
for example, that a worldwide average of 48 percent of the asset’s value is lost in debt enforcement, 
and North (1991) suggests that lack of contract enforcement is one of the key obstacles to economic 
development.   
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policies aimed at improving economic performance could be effective if they focused solely on 
formal institutions, for example seeking to improve the judicial system in order to enable better 
contract enforcement—even if levels of trust remained low. Likewise, policies aimed at moving a 
society out of a low-trust trap, such as public awareness campaigns that promote codes of conduct 
or advertise role models of trustful business relations, could be effective—even if formal 
institutions remained weak and ensured only very imperfect contract enforcement. If, however, 
trust and contract enforcement were complements, the above policies might remain fairly 
ineffective if pursued in isolation. Policies would then be more likely to be successful if they 
simultaneously improve formal institutions that ensure better contract enforcement and raise trust 
levels.  
In this paper we report the results of controlled experiments showing that trust and contract 
enforcement can be complements for the realization of gains from trade. We show, in particular, 
that an independent improvement in contract enforcement at low levels of trust generates no or 
only small increases in gains from trade, while improvements in contract enforcement cause large 
increases in the average gains from trade at high trust levels. Likewise, our data indicate that an 
increase in trust leads to no improvement in the gains from trade if contract enforcement is weak 
but to high increases in gains from trade when contract enforcement is strong. Our results are based 
on the exogenous variation of trust and contract enforcement in a laboratory experiment involving 
principals and agents who face profitable trading opportunities in an experimental market. The key 
advantage of this approach is that it allows for a clean separation of the effects of trust and contract 
enforcement and their interaction on the realized gains from trade.  
What are the economic and psychological mechanisms that drive the complementarity 
between trust and contract enforcement? To provide deeper intuitions into the underlying 
mechanisms, we need to provide a bit more detail about the experiment.  
Our experiment involves principal-agent interactions, where the principals make contract 
offers in an experimental market by promising to pay a wage and requesting an effort level from 
the agents, while the agents choose the actual effort level after they accepted an offer. The gains 
from trade are increasing in effort, but there is a conflict of interest as higher effort benefits the 
principal while being costly for the agent. In all of our treatments, the enforcement of effort is 
imperfect because effort is not third party verifiable and thus not contractible. Subjects interact in 
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markets of seven principals and ten agents for 15 periods. In a given period, a  match between a 
principal and an agent occurs if an agent accepts a principal’s offer.  
We implement variation in the contractual environment by varying the degree of contract 
enforcement as follows. In our weak contracting environment, the principal can pay any wage to 
the agent, irrespective of the wage that was promised in the contract.2 The principal and the agent 
simultaneously choose the actual wage and actual effort after the agent accepted the contract. In 
addition, the parties face an informational constraint that prevents them from making contracts 
contingent on signals of past behavior. We implement this constraint by scrambling (i.e., re-
randomizing) the ID numbers of principals and agents across periods such that interactions remain 
one-shot. In our medium contracting environment, we improve contract enforcement by rendering 
the principals’ wage promises legally enforceable, i.e., the principal is forced to pay the promised 
wage. Otherwise, this treatment is identical to the weak contracting environment. Our strong 
contracting environment adds an additional improvement in contract enforcement by keeping 
identification numbers the same across rounds. This allows principals to make their contract offers 
contingent on signals about the agents’ previous effort choices.  
We implement (and verify) variation in principals’ initial trust about the agents’ 
trustworthiness by showing the principals, before the start of the experiment, examples of real 
historical effort choices in experimental sessions in which the agents either exhibit trustworthy 
behavior (shown in our high-trust treatments) or untrustworthy behavior (shown in our low-trust 
treatments). If the principals’ trust has a positive causal effect we should observe it by comparing 
the high-trust treatments with the low trust treatments. 
How do we explain our finding that the impact of trust actually depends on strength of 
contract enforcement, and vice versa? Our investigation of mechanisms suggest three key 
ingredients: (1) heterogeneity in agents’ trustworthiness; (2) an impact of contract enforcement on 
the ability of principals to elicit high efforts from trustworthy agents, and to distinguish trustworthy 
from untrustworthy agents and engage in reciprocal relationships with the former; (3) an impact 
of principals’ initial trust on their willingness to try such strategies.   
                                                 
2 This contracting environment may reflect a weak or inefficient judicial system—as is often the 
case in developing countries—or informal contracting with merely verbal promises. In developing 
countries a large share of workers, sometimes even a majority, is employed casually in the informal 
sector (Banerjee and Duflo 2007, La Porta and Shleifer 2014, McCaig and Pavcnik 2015).   
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Regarding the first ingredient, a large experimental literature indicates that there is 
heterogeneity in trustworthiness, and our data are in line with this as well. Previous studies have 
shown that many agents are trustworthy, in that they are willing to reciprocate with high effort if 
they are offered high, generous wages that not only cover their cost but also give them a fair share 
of the available surplus. While a significant share of subjects have social preferences that imply 
such reciprocal, fairness-motivated responses, the literature also shows that there is typically a 
significant share of relatively selfish subjects who are untrustworthy in that they show only weak 
or no preference for fairness or reciprocal behavior (e.g., Konow, 2000, 2003; Fehr and Schmidt, 
1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Charness and Rabin, 2002; Cappelen et al., 2007, 2013). Our 
data also show signs of a mix of reciprocal and selfish behaviors of agents: If agents receive low 
wages before making their effort choices, almost all choose low efforts, but if they receive higher 
wages, there emerges substantial heterogeneity, with some agents choosing minimum effort 
(untrustworthy) but others responding with high effort levels (trustworthy). 
Against this backdrop of heterogeneity, it turns out that the strength of the contracting 
environment affects the ability of principals to elicit high efforts from the reciprocal agents, thus 
generating high gains from trade. Under weak contracting, while principals typically promise to 
pay high wages, this is not contractually enforceable, and indeed principals rarely live up to their 
promises and actually pay very low wages. The agents quickly anticipate that they cannot rely on 
the principals’ promises and, therefore, even reciprocal agents show little willingness to respond 
to high offered wages with high effort. As a consequence, the principals also have little reason to 
keep their promises because if they keep them they experience no return. In other words, the lack 
of legal enforcement of wage promises undermines agents’ reciprocal behavior and generates a 
“low wage – low effort” equilibrium.  
In the final part of the paper we present a theoretical model that captures key features of 
our experimental game, and heterogeneity in agent types, in a simplified way. The model explains 
the above described empirical regularities of our weak contracting environment. It shows that the 
“low wage – low effort” equilibrium is unique, and predicts, in particular, that an exogenous shock 
to the principals’ beliefs about the agents’ trustworthiness has no effects on wages, effort and gains 
from trade—which is what we observe in this contracting environment.  
The legal enforcement of the principals’ wage promises in our medium contract 
environment constitutes a major improvement in contract enforcement because the principals can 
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now credibly commit themselves to high wages. The agents therefore know that a high wage 
promise indeed offers them a generous share of the surplus, which prompts reciprocal agents to 
respond to higher wages with higher effort levels. Because our high-trust manipulation generates 
optimistic beliefs about the agents’ trustworthiness, in the sense that principals believe that agents 
honor high wages with high effort, while in our low-trust manipulation they believe in a weaker 
reciprocal response, the principals have a reason to pay higher wages in the high- compared to the 
low-trust condition—which is confirmed by the data. Reciprocally motivated agents then respond 
with higher effort levels in the high- compared to the low-trust condition, which explains the 
positive average trust effect on gains from trade in the medium contracting environment.  
Is the trust effect on the gains from trade in the medium contracting environment stable, 
i.e., an equilibrium phenomenon? Or is it due to a transitory effect of changing the principals’ 
initial beliefs about the agents’ trustworthiness? To answer this question, we need to examine 
whether the principals benefitted on average from paying high wages in the high-trust 
environment. It turns out that this is not the case, i.e., the agents’ effort increase in response to a 
wage increase is insufficient to render the wage increase profitable on average; this modest average 
response reflects agent heterogeneity, with some agents having a strong response, but others 
choosing minimal effort regardless of the wage. Paying higher wages in the high-trust environment 
is not profitable on average, but the principals learn this only slowly over time. This learning 
process is indicated by the fact that wage offers in the high-trust condition are decreasing and 
towards the end they are so low that the agents provide statistically indistinguishable effort levels 
in the high- and the low-trust condition of the medium contracting environment.   
Our theoretical model rationalizes the transitory nature of the increase in the gains from 
trade in the medium contracting environment. The model shows that if the agents’ reciprocal effort 
responses are insufficiently strong (e.g., because the share of reciprocally motivated agents is too 
small) there is still a unique “low wage – low effort” equilibrium. However, the model also predicts 
that initially false (i.e., too optimistic) beliefs of the principals about the agents’ trustworthiness 
induce the principals to make initially too high wage offers.  
Finally, we show that there is a large and stable trust effect on agent efforts, and thus the 
gains from trade, in our strong contracting environment. In addition to making credible wage 
promises, principals can also condition their current contract offers on the agents’ past 
performance signals in this environment. Principals can do this by making no offer, or an offer 
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with a lower wage to agents with low previous performance signals, and by targeting high wage 
offers to agents with high previous performance signals. Empirically, principals in the high-trust 
condition indeed screen agents in this way and target their high wage offers to agents who 
previously signaled their trustworthiness; therefore, the wage-effort relation is substantially 
steeper in the strong compared to the medium contracting environment. This in turn means that 
high wages can be profitable. In the low-trust condition, however, the principals believe that the 
wage-effort relation is relatively flat and, therefore, make only low wage offers right from the 
beginning, choosing not to try to screen for agents who respond to high wages with high efforts. 
These wage differences between the high and the low trust condition are large and stable over time 
and induce large and stable effort differences based on the agents’ reciprocal effort responses. 
Our theoretical model rationalizes these findings because it shows that there coexist a high-
trust screening equilibrium, and a low-trust pooling equilibrium in the strong contracting 
environment. The initial variation in the principals’ trust causes stable variation in the realized 
gains from trade by selecting between these equilibria.  
Our paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, it documents experimentally 
that the effects of improvements in contract enforcement on gains from trade can be trust-
dependent. To our knowledge, this is a novel empirical finding that may generally be interesting 
for the economics of contracts and institutions (e.g., Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005; North, 1991) 
and, in particular, for behavioral contract theory that examines the effects of non-standard motives 
and social norms on the functioning of contracts and incentives (e.g., Ellingsen and Johannesson, 
2005, 2008; Sliwka, 2007; Hart and Moore, 2008; Hart, 2009; Hart and Holmström, 2010; Herweg 
and Schmidt, 2015; Bierbrauer and Netzer 2016; Danilov and Sliwka, 2017; Sliwka and Werner, 
2017). In addition, our findings on the role of trust in our strong contracting environment are also 
of interest for the literature on relational contracting (e.g., MacLeod and Malcomson, 1998; 
MacLeod, 2007; Gibbons, 1998; Baker et al., 2002; Gibbons et al., 2020).  
Second, it clarifies the conditions under which we can expect a causal effect of trust on 
gains from trade, and it shows the important role of the contracting environment in the transmission 
of initial trust differences on wages, efforts, and gains from trade. Our paper thus contributes to 
the debate on the effect of trust on economic outcomes (e.g., Knack and Keefer, 1997; La Porta et 
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al., 1997; Guiso et al., 2009; Algan and Cahuc, 2010; Bloom et al., 2012) by clarifying when we 
can expect no, only transitory, or stable and large long run effects of changes in trust.3  
Third, by empirically showing conditions for the emergence of a stable and efficient 
reciprocal principal-agent interaction, our paper is also related to the literature on reciprocal gift 
exchange and trust using laboratory experiments (Fehr et al., 1993; Berg et al., 1995; Brown et al., 
2004; Charness, 2004). Previous papers in the gift-exchange literature and more recent papers on 
the counterproductive effects of sanctions and other measures that constrain shirking by agents 
suggest that trust might be self-confirming (e.g., Bohnet et al., 2001; Bohnet and Huck, 2004; Falk 
and Kosfeld, 2006; Bartling et al., 2012). However, this literature does neither address the 
interaction of exogenous variations in trust and contract enforcement, nor does it identify the 
conditions or mechanisms under which we should expect that trust affects trading efficiency. 
Finally, our paper offers a simple theoretical model that captures the main empirical 
regularities in our experiment and thus facilitates a coherent interpretation of the data. The model 
rationalizes, in particular, why an exogenous increase in trust has no effect on gains from trade in 
the weak contracting environment, only a transient effect in the medium contracting environment, 
and a stable effect in the strong contracting environment.  
The theoretical literature has shown before that different levels of trust can arise in a given 
economic environment due to multiple equilibria (e.g., Tabellini, 2008; Aghion et al., 2010) or 
multiple stable long-run outcomes of dynamic learning processes (e.g., Bower et al., 1996). Our 
experiment provides a first explicit test of the general idea that trust can play a role due to multiple 
equilibria: the empirical result that an exogenous increase in trust has no stable effect in a unique 
equilibrium environment but leads to stable effects in a multiple equilibrium environment 
demonstrates this point. Our theoretical model, however, differs from the existing literature in two 
important ways. First, we follow a standard game-theoretic approach with fixed preferences, while 
Tabellini (2008) and Aghion et al. (2010) study behavior that is transmitted from generation to 
generation and coevolves slowly with external institutions. Our theoretical and empirical results 
show that trust is malleable rather quickly and can have immediate and stable causal effects even 
with fixed preferences and institutions. Second, in models like Bower et al. (1996), where agents 
                                                 
3 Our paper varies trust exogenously and examines the consequences of trust. There is also a 
literature that studies the individual and collective determinants of trust (e.g. Alesina and LaFerrara 
2000 and 2005). For a review of the literature on the determinants of trust see Fehr (2009).  
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learn about a given population state, long-run levels of trust and economic efficiency cannot be 
manipulated by interventions that select between different equilibria. By contrast, we show that 
selecting the right equilibrium is an important consideration in the design of organizations and 
mechanisms. This idea has also recently played an important role in organizational econonomics 
where it has been argued that a deeper understanding of the forces that enable organizations to 
“build” a more efficient equilibrium is key in understanding why some organizations persistently 
perform better than others (Gibbons and Henderson, 2012; Gibbons, 2020; Gibbons et al., 2020).4  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains our experimental 
design and contains a manipulation check showing that our exogenous variation of trust is 
effective. Section 3 presents our main empirical finding on the complementarity between trust and 
contractual enforcement. Section 4 reveals the behavioral mechanisms behind our main empirical 
findings by analyzing in detail how differences in the contractual environment shape the behavior 
of principals and agents. Section 5 presents our theoretical analysis of the principal-agent game, 
which helps us interpret and understand the empirical patterns described in the previous sections. 
Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Experimental Design  
We study the impact of an exogenous variation in principals’ beliefs about the trustworthiness of 
agents on wages, effort and gains from trade. To study the interaction between exogenous changes 
in principals’ trust and the contract enforcement environment, we also vary the degree to which 
parties can enforce contracts. We adopt a typical principal-agent framework where a higher effort 
level by the agent increases the principal’s expected payoff but providing higher effort is more 
costly for the agent. Principals and agents interact in an experimental market and we allow for 15 
market periods, so that we can study how wages, effort and gains from trade evolve over time. 
This feature make it possible to study whether exogenous changes in trust or contract enforcement 
have stable or only transitory effects.  
In our design, principals cannot directly observe effort levels but they receive an 
informative stochastic signal about the agents’ effort choices, and higher effort levels are 
                                                 
4 In this context, the complementarity between trust and contract enforcement (i.e., incentives) is 
also important. Our findings suggest that to reap the available gains from trade it sometimes 
needs a change in incentives and a change in trust.  
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associated with an increase in the probability of observing a high signal. In many types of 
economic interactions it is not possible to precisely identify whether effort or (bad) luck is 
responsible for the observed output. The effort signal is observable by the principal and the agent, 
but it is not verifiable by third parties and thus not directly contractible. Contracts are therefore 
necessarily incomplete and the effort choice of an agent cannot be legally enforced. The principal’s 
belief that an agent is trustworthy may then be relevant for the principal’s willingness to enter a 
trade with an agent and for the contract terms the principal offers. We define agents to be 
trustworthy when they are willing to reciprocate a high wage offer with a high effort choice 
although high effort reduces their material payoff. Untrustworthy agents, by contrast, always 
choose low effort levels irrespective of the offered wages. 
Our treatments vary the degree to which the parties can enforce their agreement. In all 
treatments, the principal proposes a contract that offers a wage and requests an effort level from 
the agent. In the “weak contract enforcement” environment (WEAK), however, neither the offered 
wage nor the requested effort level is legally enforceable. This environment thus represents a 
situation with weak legal institutions. Furthermore, the identities of principals and agents are not 
observable, and thus contract terms cannot be conditioned on the agent’s past performance signal. 
In the “medium contract enforcement” environment (MEDIUM) we increase the scope for contract 
enforcement by making the principals’ wage offers legally binding but the agent is still free to 
choose any effort level, and it is still not possible to make contracts contingent on past performance 
signals. In our “strong contract enforcement” environment (STRONG), principals’ wage offers are 
again legally binding and agents are still free to choose any effort, but the subjects now have fixed 
identification numbers over the course of the experiment. Principals can therefore target their 
offers to specific agents contingent on their past performance signals, which is a further expansion 
of the set of contractible contingencies relative to the other treatments. Performance signals from 
past periods are only observed by the respective principals with whom the agent interacted in a 
these periods.  
 
2.1 Stage Game Payoffs 
If a principal and an agent agree to trade, then the principal pays a wage 𝑤 ∈ 1, … ,100  to the 
agent and the agent chooses an effort level 𝑒 ∈ 1, … ,9 . The agent’s effort choice stochastically 
determines the value of the interaction for the principal. There are only two possible value levels, 
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100 and 10. The probability that the principal receives the high value is given by 𝑒/10, while the 
principal receives the low value with probability 1 𝑒/10. The expected material payoffs of 
principals are thus given by 
 𝐸 Π  100 ∙ 10 ⋅ 1 𝑤
0
  if principal and agent interact 
otherwise
 (1) 
 Π  𝑤 𝑐 𝑒
5
  if principal and agent interact
otherwise
 (2) 
where 𝑐 𝑒  denotes the agent’s cost of providing effort. The outside option of an agent who does 
not interact with a principal is 5. Table 1 shows the cost function 𝑐 𝑒 . The cost function is strictly 
increasing and exhibits weakly increasing marginal costs. Since the marginal cost of effort is at 
most 3, while the marginal expected value is always 9, the efficient effort level is 𝑒  9. 
 
Table 1: Agents’ Cost Function 
Effort 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Cost 0 1 2 4 6 8 10 12 15 
 
2.2 Contracting Environments 
Principals can initiate trades by offering contracts to the agents. Agents can choose among the 
available contract offers but they cannot make offers to principals. There are 15 trading periods. 
Each period, a principal can interact with at most one agent, and an agent can accept at most one 
contract offer. A period has two stages. In stage one, the principals make contract offers and agents 
decide whether or not to accept a contract. If a principal and an agent conclude a contract, they 
enter stage two, where the principal pays a wage and the agent chooses an effort level.  
A contract offer consists of a wage offer 𝑤 ∈ 1, … ,100 , a requested effort level ?̃? ∈
1, … ,9 , and the principal’s identification number (ID). The wage offer 𝑤 is third-party verifiable 
and thus contractible in treatments MEDIUM and STRONG, but not in treatment WEAK. The 
requested effort level ?̃? is not binding. The principal can observe the realized value but not the 
agent’s actual effort choice. Indeed, actual effort levels 𝑒 are never third-party verifiable, which 
rules out that requested effort levels are legally enforceable in any of our contracting environments. 
There are two types of offers, public and private. In private offers, a principal indicates the 
agent’s ID with whom he or she wants to trade, and only this agent is informed about the contract 
12 
 
offer. In public offers, all agents (and also the other principals) are informed about the offer; hence, 
each agent has the chance to accept a public offer. A principal can make as many private offers 
and as many public offers as he or she wants in a given period. However, once an agent accepts 
one of the offers, the principal is matched with this agent, learns the ID of the matched agent 
(which is new information in case of a public offer), and his other outstanding offers are removed 
from the market.5 The default at the beginning of each period is that no agent has a contract and 
no principal has made an offer. There are always ten agents and seven principals in a market, i.e., 
there is an excess supply of three agents. 
At the end of each period, each subject is informed about the own payoff and reminded of 
the contract (𝑤, ?̃?) he or she had concluded and the trading partner’s ID. Agents are also informed 
about the payoff of their respective principal. Principals are not informed about the payoff of their 
respective agent, because a principal does not observe the agent’s effort choice and thus the cost 
of providing this effort level. The subjects write this information on a printed form that is provided 
along with the experimental instructions. This procedure ensures that each subject can always 
remind herself about her own trading history. 
 
2.2.1 Contracting Environment WEAK 
An agent can choose any actual effort level 𝑒 ∈ 1, … ,9  after having accepted a contract offer in 
our contracting environment WEAK, irrespective of the requested effort level ?̃?. Likewise, the 
principal can pay any wage to the agent, irrespective of the offered wage. Actual wages and effort 
levels are chosen simultaneously at the second stage of a period. Moreover, the subjects’ 
identification numbers (IDs) are randomly reshuffled in each of the 15 periods of the experiment 
in contracting environment WEAK. Random IDs preclude the principals from conditioning future 
contract offers on past performance signals. Neither of the two contracting parties thus faces legal 
or economic incentives to stick to the terms of the contract in contracting environment WEAK, 
but intrinsic motivation or social preferences could still induce them to honor their mutual 
promises.  
  
                                                 
5 To prevent principals from making private offers to agents who have already concluded a contract 




2.2.2 Contracting Environment MEDIUM 
A principal is obliged to pay the offered wage if an agent accepts his or her contract offer in our 
contracting environment MEDIUM. An agent, however, can still choose any actual effort level 
𝑒 ∈ 1, … ,9 , irrespective of the requested effort level ?̃?. Principals must thus stick to the terms of 
the contract in contracting environment MEDIUM while agents face no legal or economic 
incentives to provide the requested effort level. Because IDs are still randomly shuffled in every 
period, as in contracting environment WEAK, principals cannot condition hiring and contract 
terms on signals about the past performance of specific agents. 
 
2.2.3 Contracting Environment STRONG 
Contract enforcement is strengthened further in our contracting environment STONG. The 
principal is obliged to pay the offered wage 𝑤 if an agent accepts the contract, as in contracting 
environment MEDIUM. Moreover, while agents can still choose any actual effort level 𝑒 ∈
1, … ,9 , irrespective of the requested effort level ?̃?, IDs of all players are fixed in our contracting 
environment STONG. This feature provides principals with the opportunity to condition their 
contract offers on the identity of a specific agent and this agent’s past performance signals. This 
provides principals with the ability to screen agents and selectively target high wages to those who 
have high past performance signals.6 
 
2.3 Inducing Variation in Principals’ Trust 
To potentially induce exogenous variation the principals’ initial trust levels, we randomly assigned 
them to two different information conditions. In the high-trust treatments, the principals were 
informed about a “historical example” in which agents behaved in a trustworthy manner; in the 
low-trust treatments, they were shown an example in which agents displayed a low level of 
trustworthiness. More specifically, for our high-trust treatments we selected the market from 
Brown et al. (2004) that had the steepest wage-effort relation, and for the low-trust treatments we 
selected the market with the flattest wage-effort relation.  
                                                 
6 The idea of inducing one shot play by re-randomizing ID numbers every period and enabling 
long-run relationships by (i) fixing ID numbers throughout the experiment and (ii) allowing for 
private offers to specific agents is taken from Brown et. al. (2004). Their paper does however not 
vary exogenous trust levels and thus cannot study the interaction between the strength of contract 
enforcement and trust.  
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The example was provided at the end of the experimental instructions. Subjects were 
informed that the information provided was an “example,” and that it showed how effort is related 
to wage levels “in a past session.” Subjects were told that the information in the example was 
something that they “could use in their decisions today.” The description of the source of the 
example was completely truthful but deliberately vague, and we did not claim that the information 
provided about a single past session was representative. 
Figure 1 shows how we presented the examples to the subjects in the instructions. The top 
row was shown to the principals in the high-trust treatments, the bottom row to the principals in 
the low-trust treatments. On the left, the wage-effort relation is shown. The figure shows the 
average effort provided by the agents in the example for each of the given bins of offered wages. 
On the right, we show how this wage-effort relation translates into a wage-payoff relation, given 
the principals’ payoff function in our experiment. The high trustworthiness example involved 
agents being trustworthy, in that those who are paid high wages also exert high effort levels. In the 
low trustworthiness example, agents were untrustworthy; they provided rather low effort for all 
wage levels. 
Note that the examples contain no information about the historical frequency of wage 
choices by principals. They do indicate the range of wages that was used, but this was identical 
across the high and and low trustworthiness examples. This is deliberate because we wanted to 
rule out that the examples influence behavior by conveying information about historical behavior 
of principals. Rather, the differential information content across examples is solely about the 
trustworthiness of agents. Any impact should thus come through the beliefs of principals about 
trustworthiness. We will examine in Section 2.5 the extent to which our trust manipulation was 
effective in the sense that it differentially affected principals’ beliefs. 
Subjects in the role of agents did not receive any example, nor were they informed that the 
subjects in the role of principals received such information. The instructions for agents did not 
differ in the high- and low-trust treatments, which rules out any direct impact on outcomes through 
an influence on agents. This illustrates the advantages of an experimental setting for varying only 




Figure 1: The High and Low Trustworthiness Examples Shown to Principals.  
Wage-Effort Relation Wage-Payoff Relation 
Notes: The top row shows the example provided to the principals in the high-trust treatments, 
the bottom row shows the example provided in the low-trust treatments. The wage-effort 
relation is shown on the left, the corresponding expected wage-payoff relation on the right. 
 
2.4 Experimental Procedures 
We exposed all principals in a session to either the high-trust (HT) or the low-trust (LT) 
manipulation in the three contracting environments WEAK, MEDIUM, and STRONG. We thus 
implemented a 3x2 factorial design, crossing contracting environment and trust manipulation. This 
is indicated in the labels that we use to refer to the treatments. WEAK-HT, for example, stands for 
the treatment in which we implemented the weak contracting environment and exposed the 
principals to the high trustworthiness example. We conducted five markets for each of our six main 
treatments, as shown in Table 2. We also conducted two markets of a control treatment denoted 
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STRONG-HT-Long, which is identical to STRONG-HT, except that the game lasted 25 periods 
rather than 15 periods. We use STRONG-HT-Long to clarify the possible role of end-game 
effects7.  
 
Table 2: Treatment Overview 
Treatment 
Principals’ 









WEAK-LT non-binding random low 15 5 
WEAK-HT non-binding random high 15 5 
MEDIUM-LT binding random low 15 5 
MEDIUM-HT binding random high 15 5 
STRONG-LT binding fixed low 15 5 
STRONG-HT binding fixed high 15 5 
STRONG-HT-Long binding fixed high 25 2 
 
We implemented a between-subjects design, i.e., each subject participated in only one 
market in one treatment. Altogether we have 32 markets, with seven principals and ten agents 
each. Hence, 544 subjects participated in our experiment. Subjects were mainly students from the 
University of Zurich and the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich. Students majoring 
in economics or psychology were not eligible to participate.  
All sessions took place at the computer laboratory of the Department of Economics at the 
University of Zurich. The study was computerized with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) 
and the recruitment was conducted with the software ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). Before the subjects 
entered the lab, they randomly drew a place card that specified at which computer terminal to sit. 
The terminal number determined a subject’s role as either principal or agent, which remained fixed 
throughout the experiment.  
                                                 
7 Endgame effects reliably occur in finitely repeated cooperation games such as the prisoner’s 
dilemma and can typically be shifted into the future with a longer finite horizon (Embay, Frechette, 
Yuksel 2019). Similar effects can be observed in finitely repeated gift exchange experiments (see 
e.g., Brown, Falk and Fehr 2004). Thus, we conjectured that we will also observe an endgame 
effect in treatment STRONG-HT. Because we are interested in the stable effects of trust in 
STRONG-HT (i.e., in periods in which the endgame effect is not operative), we wanted to examine 
whether we can extend the effect of exogenous increases in trust by simply increasing the number 
of periods.  
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Subjects received written instructions including comprehension questions, which had to be 
answered correctly before a session could begin.8 A summary of the instructions was read aloud 
by the experimenter to generate common knowledge of the instructions. There were also two 
practice periods before the actual experiment to make the subjects familiar with the market 
procedures. Subjects only went through the first stage of the experiment in both practice periods, 
so that principals did not observe payoffs and could not draw inferences about agents’ actual effort 
choices. No money could be earned during the two practice periods.  
Sessions lasted about 2.5 hours. Payoffs from the experiment, denominated in points, were 
converted into money at the rate of 10 points to CHF 1 (about $ 1.05 at the time of the experiments) 
at the end of a session. On average, subjects earned about CHF 47.65, which includes a show-up 
fee of CHF 20. The subjects received their payments privately.  
 
2.5 Manipulation Check 
Our experimental approach aims at potentially inducing exogenous variation in the principals’ 
beliefs about the agents’ trustworthiness. Figure 2 provides a manipulation check by showing the 
principals’ expectations about the empirical relationship between offered wages and chosen effort. 
These expectations were elicited at the beginning of the experiment, after reading the instructions 
but before entering the trading periods. We asked principals to predict what they thought would 
be the average effort level chosen by agents, conditional on different possible offered wages.  
The figure reveals exogenous belief variation in all contracting environments, WEAK-HT 
vs. WEAK-LT, MEDIUM-HT vs. MEDIUM-LT, and STRONG-HT vs. STRONG-LT. Principals 
expected significantly higher average effort levels across the range of wages when they had 
received the high trustworthiness example rather than the low trustworthiness example, and also 
expected significantly steeper relationships between wage and effort. Regressions confirm that the 
differences in average expected effort across the high and the low trustworthiness example were 
statistically significant at the 1-percent level, as were the differences in slopes, in all three 
                                                 
8 We provide the experimental instructions in the additional supplement to this paper. Since the 
terms “principal” and “agent” are not in common usage among student subjects, the experiment 
was framed in terms of “buyers” and “sellers,” and we spoke about “price” and “quality” instead 
of “wage” and “effort.” 
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treatment pairs.9 On the other hand, we cannot reject the hypotheses that the average expected 
effort, and the slopes of the wage-effort relations, are identical when comparing across treatments 
involving the low trustworthiness example, and across treatments involving the high 
trustworthiness example.10 
 
Figure 2: Manipulation Check 
 
Notes: The black lines show the wage-effort relation that principals expect in the 
three high-trust treatments WEAK-HT, MEDIUM-HT, and STRONG-HT. The grey 
lines show expectations in the three low-trust treatments WEAK-LT, MEDIUM-LT, 
and STRONG-LT.  
 
Since the agents do not receive historical examples about agents’ trustworthiness in a 
previous experiment, random assignment should result in no differences in agents’ beliefs across 
treatments involving high versus low trustworthiness examples. Indeed, we cannot reject the 
                                                 
9 The results for average expected effort are from OLS regressions of principals’ expectations 
about effort on the relevant treatment dummy, clustering standard errors at the subject level. All 
treatment dummy coefficients are significant at the 1-percent level. Results for the differences in 
slopes are from OLS regressions of expected effort on the relevant treatment dummy, the offered 
wage, and an interaction term, clustering on subject. All coefficients of the interaction terms are 
significant at the 1-percent level. 
10 The results are based on OLS regressions of principals’ expectations about effort on the 




hypothesis that the agents’ expectations about average effort, and the slope of the wage-effort 
relations, are identical within each of the treatment pairs.11 Since the agents indicate their 
“homegrown” beliefs, we can compare these beliefs with the beliefs that the principals indicate. 
We find that the principals’ beliefs in the high-trust treatments roughly correspond to the agents’ 
homegrown beliefs. Principals who received the low trustworthiness example thus have beliefs 
that are more pessimistic than homegrown beliefs. 
 
3. The Complementarity of Trust and Contract Enforcement  
In this section, we present our main result on the complementarity between trust and contract 
enforcement for the expected gains from trade. Figure 3 shows the average effort level in our three 
contracting environments, comparing the high-trust and the low-trust conditions. Effort is a 
sufficient statistic for the expected gains from trade, as higher effort levels directly generate higher 
average gains from trade. 
 
Figure 3: Expected Gains from Trade 
 
Notes: Effort is a sufficient statistic for expected gains from trade. The black line shows 
the average effort in the high-trust environment in treatments WEAK, MEDIUM, and 
STRONG. The grey line shows the respective average effort in the low-trust environment.  
                                                 
11 The results are based on OLS regressions of agents’ expectations about effort on the appropriate 
treatment dummies and interaction terms, clustering standard errors at the subject level. 
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First, Figure 3 reveals that an exogenous increase in trust has no effect in contracting 
environment WEAK, where principals are not obliged to pay the promised wage. This is in our 
view an interesting finding because it indicates that under weak legal and economic contract 
enforcement institutions, higher trust alone cannot increase trading efficiency.  
Second, the figure reveals that the effect of trust on the expected gains from trade is positive 
under improved contract enforcement conditions. The causal effect of trust is positive and 
statistically significant in contracting environment MEDIUM, where the principals are 
contractually obliged to pay the offered wage (Wilcoxon rank-sum test of market averages; 
p<0.02).12  
Third, the figure shows that the effect of trust is largest in contracting environment 
STRONG. Corresponding regressions show that the differences in the impact of trust are 
significantly different across the institutional environments (for MEDIUM vs. STRONG this is 
true excluding an end-game effect in STRONG, which we discuss in more detail later).13  
Figure 3 also shows that the effect of exogenous improvements in the contracting 
environment are strongly trust-dependent. While improvements in contract enforcement induce a 
large increase in expected gains from trade in the high-trust environment, much smaller (if any) 
effects are observed in the low-trust environment. This again  indicates the strong complementarity 
between trust and the legal/economic contract enforcement environment for trading efficiency. It 
is not sufficient to merely improve the contract enforcement environment alone or the actors’ 
beliefs in the trustworthiness of their trading partners. Rather, the biggest increase in the gains 
from trade emerges when both contract enforcement and trust are simultaneously increased. We 
summarize these observations in our first result. 
  
                                                 
12 All Wilcoxon rank-sum tests reported in the paper are based on market averages, i.e., taking 
markets as the unit of independent observation, to allow for potential interdependence between 
observations from the same market.  
13 Regressions reported in the paper have random effects on principals and bootstrapped standard 
errors clustering on market session (30 clusters). See the interaction terms HT WEAK and 
HT STRONG in model (4) in Table A3 where effort is regressed on the various institutional 
treatments (WEAK, MEDIUM, STRONG), the trust level (HT vs. LT) and their interactions. The 
positively significant coefficient of the interaction term HT STRONG (p<0.04) indicates that the 
positive impact of HT in MEDIUM on effort becomes even larger in STRONG. The negatively 
significant coeffient of HT WEAK (p<0.01) indicates that the positive impact of HT in treatment 
MEDIUM becomes negligible in WEAK.  
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Result 1: (a) Trust and contract enforcement are complements with regard to gains 
from trade. While an exogenous increase in trust has no effect on expected gains from 
trade when contract enforcement is weak, higher levels of trust induce increasingly 
higher expected gains from trade when contract enforcement is exogenously 
strengthened. (b) Likewise, an exogenous improvement in contract enforcement 
causes no or little increase in the expected gains from trade at low trust levels but 
generates substantial increases in the gains from trade at high trust levels.  
 
4. Mechanisms 
The previous section established a complementarity between trust and contract enforcement for 
gains from trade between principals and agents. In this section, we study the mechanisms 
underlying this finding, by analyzing the behaviors of principals and agents in more detail. 
 
4.1 Weak Contract Enforcement 
Principals are not obliged to pay the offered wages and agents are not obliged to choose the 
requested effort levels in contracting environment WEAK. Recall that interactions are one-shot, 
IDs are random across periods, and principals and agents, after they agreed on a contract, 
simultaneously choose their actual wages and effort levels, respectively. 
Figure 4 reveals that the principals, on average, do not honor their promises. The dashed 
lines show the average offered wages over the course of the 15 periods of the experiment in the 
high-trust treatment WEAK-HT (black) and in the low-trust treatment WEAK-LT (hollow). The 
solid lines show the average actual wages in WEAK-HT (black) and WEAK-LT (hollow). While 
offered wages even increase over the course of the 15 periods to values above 50 in WEAK-HT 
and above 40 in WEAK-LT, actually paid wages drop to values below 10 in both treatments. 
Principals paid the promised wages only in 13 and 10 percent of all transactions in WEAK-HT 
and WEAK-LT, respectively. 
Actual wages are 11.6 on average in WEAK-HT and 8.5 in WEAK-LT (Wilcoxon rank-
sum test, p=0.08). While there is a small and marginally significant effect of an exogenous increase 
in trust on actually paid average wages, Figure 4 reveals that this effect is driven by the earlier 
periods only; it declines and is entirely absent in the last five periods of the experiment. Regression 
(1) in Table A1 in the Appendix confirms that the difference in actually paid wages between 
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WEAK-HT and WEAK-LT is getting significantly smaller over time. We summarize these 
observations in our next result.  
 
Result 2: With weak contract enforcement, the principals promise to pay high wages 
to the agents but rarely honor their promises, both in the high-trust and in the low-
trust environment. Actual wages are low in both environments. While promised 
wages are always higher in the high-trust environment, actual wages in the high and 
low-trust environment converge towards the same level. 
 
Figure 4: Promised and Actual Wages in Contracting Environment WEAK 
 
Notes: The black squares show offered (dashed line) and actual (solid line) wages 
in the high-trust environment. The hollow squares show offered (dashed line) and 
actual (solid line) wages in the low-trust environment.  
 
Result 2 shows that the agents have little reason to believe that the principals pay the 
promised high wages. As a consequence, the agents—regardless of whether they are reciprocal or 
selfish types—have no reason to provide the effort levels requested by the principals in the 
contracts. Indeed, Figure 5 shows that the agents in contracting environment WEAK do not deliver 
the effort levels that the principals requested. The two dashed lines show the average effort levels 
requested by the principals over the course of the 15 periods in WEAK-HT (black) and WEAK-
LT (hollow). The two solid lines show the average actual effort levels delivered by the agents in 
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WEAK-HT (black) and WEAK-LT (hollow). While requested effort levels range between 7 and 8 
in the high-trust environment and between 6 and 7 in the low-trust environment, actually delivered 
effort levels drop to values around 2 in both environments. Agents delivered the requested effort 
level only in 7 and 16 percent of all transactions in WEAK-HT and WEAK-LT, respectively.  
 
Figure 5: Requested and Actual Effort Levels in Contracting Environment WEAK 
 
Notes: The black squares show requested (dashed line) and actual (solid line) effort 
levels in the high-trust environment. The hollow squares show requested (dashed 
line) and actual (solid line) effort levels in the low-trust environment.  
 
Figure 5 shows that agents’ effort is essentially identical in WEAK-HT and WEAK-LT. 
Effort levels in WEAK-HT start at slightly higher levels than in WEAK-LT but also decline 
slightly more over time (see the small but significantly negative coefficient on HT x Period in 
regression (1) in Table A2 of the Appendix; p < 0.05). No difference exists in average effort levels 
in WEAK-HT and WEAK-LT (2.5 and 2.6, Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p=0.75). We summarize this 
finding next.  
 
Result 3: With weak contract enforcement, the agents rarely honor their implicit 
promises to deliver the requested effort level, both in the high-trust and in the low-




A key feature of treatment WEAK is that the principals cannot commit to paying high 
wages and therefore the agents may not consider high offered wages as a credible promise. Thus, 
for agents with a reciprocity motive the desire to reciprocate to high wage offers with high effort 
choices is undermined in treatment WEAK. However, the agents may initially, i.e., during the 
early periods, not know the extent to which the principals’ wage offers are credible. In fact, a closer 
look at the data reveals that traces of reciprocity exist, even in contracting environment WEAK. 
This holds, in particular, in early periods of the experiment, when reciprocal agents might not have 
fully realized that promised wages are rarely paid by the principals. Figure 6 shows actual effort 
levels as a function of promised wages. The left panel shows the relation for periods 1 to 5, the 
right panel for periods 6 to 15. The figure reveals that agents, on average, responded to high wage 
offers with somewhat higher effort levels in the early periods, but that the relation is substantially 
flatter in later periods (the Spearman correlation is 0.27 in periods 1 to 5, compared to 0.08 in 
periods 6 to 15).14 Thus, the lack of a legal commitment opportunity for the principals in treatment 
WEAK together with the agents’ experience during the early periods that the principals rarely 
honor their promises appears to have weakened the reciprocal agents’ responses to high promised 
wages, explaining the dynamic of falling effort levels over time.  
 
Figure 6: Promised Wages and Actual Effort Levels in Treatment Pair WEAK 
 
Notes: The left panel shows the relation between promised wages and actual effort levels 
in periods 1 to 5; the right panel shows the relations for periods 6 to 15.  
  
                                                 
14 The difference in slopes is also statistically significant. This can be seen in a panel regression of 
effort on offered price, a dummy variable for period>5, and an interaction term between this 
dummy and offered price (with random effects for principals, and bootstrapped standard errors 
clustering on session); the interaction term is highly significant and negative (p<0.001). 
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4.2 Medium Contract Enforcement 
Contract enforcement is strengthened in treatment MEDIUM relative to treatment WEAK because 
the principals are contractually obliged to pay the offered wages. Agents continue to be free to 
choose whatever effort they like. On the one hand, the principals’ one-sided commitment makes 
them more vulnerable to cheating agents. On the other hand, credible commitments to higher 
wages may induce reciprocal agents to provide higher effort levels when the wage is higher.  
We first examine the wage behavior of the principals. The middle panel of Figure 7 shows 
actual wages in contracting environment MEDIUM. In contrast to contracting environment 
WEAK (shown again in the right panel to allow for easy comparisons across treatments), the 
exogenous increase in trust is associated with a significant, though unstable, difference in actual 
wages. Wages are 33.9 on average in MEDIUM-HT and 16.5 in MEDIUM-LT. This difference of 
about 17 points is statistically significant (Wilcoxon rank sum test, p<0.01). Regression analysis 
confirms that the impact of the exogenous increase in trust is significantly larger in contracting 
environment MEDIUM than in WEAK (see the large negative coefficient on the interaction term 
HT x WEAK in regression (1) in Table A3 in the Appendix; p<0.01). However, the effect of the 
exogenous trust increase in MEDIUM becomes smaller over time, showing that the initial impact 
of trust on actual wages is steadily declining (see the negative and significant interaction term HT 
x Period in regression (2) in Table A1 in the Appendix; p<0.03). We summarize this observation 
in our next result.  
Result 4: With medium contract enforcement, an exogenous increase in trust induces 
an initial increase in principals’ wage payments, but the wage difference across trust 




Figure 7: Actual Wage Levels Over Time in All Treatments 
         STRONG MEDIUM             WEAK 
 
Notes: The black lines show average wages in sessions with the high trust treatments and the 
grey lines show average wages in sessions with the low trust treatments.  
 
 
Figure 8: Effort Levels Over Time in All Treatments 
         STRONG MEDIUM            WEAK 
 
Notes: The black lines show average effort in sessions with the high trust treatments and the 





We now turn to the behavior of agents. Figure 8 shows effort levels over time in all 
treatments. The middle panel shows that average effort is significantly higher in MEDIUM-HT 
than in MEDIUM-LT (3.7 and 2.3, respectively, Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p=0.03). Regression 
analyses confirm that the difference in effort levels between the high-trust and the low-trust 
environment is significantly larger in contracting environment MEDIUM than in WEAK (see the 
coefficient of HTWEAK in regression (3) of Table A3 in the Appendix; p<0.011). However, the 
effect of the exogenous increase in trust is declining over time. This time trend is significant as 
indicated by regression analysis and is driven by the decline in average effort levels in MEDIUM-
HT (see the interaction term HT x Period in regression (2) in Table A2 of the Appendix; p<0.01). 
The small remaining effort difference between HT and LT in MEDIUM is no longer significant in 
the final period (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p=0.34). We summarize this finding in Result 5.  
 
Result 5: With medium contract enforcement, the higher wage payments in the high-trust 
environment are associated with higher average effort levels. However, the difference in 
effort levels between the high-trust and the low-trust environment declines over time and 
becomes small and insignificant in the final period. 
 
In the previous subsection we hypothesized that the lack of wage commitment among the 
principals in treatment WEAK undermined the possibility to elicit high efforts from reciprocal 
agents by promising high wages. In MEDIUM, by contrast, wage promises are credible. Thus, we 
hypothesize that the higher effort levels observed in MEDIUM-HT may reflect the ability of 
principals to elicit reciprocal responses from some agents. Indeed, Figure 9 shows that the effort 
levels delivered by the agents in MEDIUM-HT are on average responsive to the wages paid by the 
principals, unlike in WEAK, where the effort-wage relation is basically flat. Corresponding 
regressions relating effort to actual wages confirm that this difference in slopes is statistically 
significant (see Table A4 in the appendix): In regression (1) the coefficient on actual wages is 
significantly positive (p<0.01) while the interaction term between actual wages and WEAK is 
significantly negative and of a similar absolute size (p<0.01), indicating that the effort-wage 
relation is flat in WEAK. The positive average effort response to wages in MEDIUM is consistent 
with some agents being committed by their intrinsic preferences for reciprocal behavior. However, 
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since principals reduce their wage offers over time in MEDIUM-HT, the reciprocally motivated 
agents respond by reducing their effort levels over time. The next result summarizes these findings. 
 
Result 6: Unlike with weak contract enforcement, in medium contract 
enforcement agents respond to higher actual wages with higher efforts on 
average. As principals reduce wages over time in the high trust condition, effort 
levels fall. 
 
The tendency for principals to reduce wages over time in MEDIUM-HT is understandable, 
because the average effort response to wages (Figure 9) is not strong enough to make high wages 
profitable for principals. As shown in Figure 10, average profits for principals in MEDIUM-HT 
are declining in actual wages. This decline is steep for wages above 50 but relatively flat for wages 
in the range 10 to 39, which may explain why principals only slowly learned that lowering wages 
in this range is more profitable. Corresponding regressions show that the relationship of profits to 
wages is negative in MEDIUM-HT (see the coefficient on “Actual wage” in regression (3) in Table 
A4 in the appendix, p<0.01). As expected, Figure 10 shows that paying non-minimal wages 
strongly reduces profits in WEAK; this is because there is no reciprocal response of effort to actual 
wages in WEAK. Corresponding regressions show that the difference in slopes for WEAK versus 
MEDIUM is statistically significant (see the interaction term Actual wage x WEAK in regression 




Figure 9: Wage-Effort Relation in High Trust Treatments 
 
Notes: The figure shows the average effort level provided in the high trust treatments 
for different actual wage levels in contracting environments WEAK, MEDIUM and 
STRONG. Promised and actual wage payments coincide in MEDIUM and 
STRONG. The figure excludes the final five periods in contracting environment 
STRONG to show the relations absent the end-game effect. The figure also excludes 
categories of actual wages above 70 as there are too few observations for meaningful 
comparisons (e.g., only one observation in this range for WEAK).  
 
A reason for the modest average response of effort to wages in MEDIUM-HT is 
heterogeneity in agent behavior. Some agents have a strong reciprocal response to high wages, but 
others behave selfishly and choose low efforts even for high wages. Indeed, as shown in the upper 
panels of Figure 11, for high (50+) and medium (25 to 50) wages, there is substantial heterogeneity 
in agent effort choices in MEDIUM-HT, with effort choices across the whole range. The effort 
distributions are also bi-modal, with modes at minimum effort, and relatively high (about 7) effort, 
respectively. With this heterogeneity, paying a high or even medium wage runs the risk of getting 
an agent who chooses low or minimum effort, thereby generating a large loss. As was shown in 
Figure 10, principals are better off paying relatively low wages, even though this means getting 
low efforts from both reciprocal and selfish agents (see upper left-hand panel of Figure 11). These 




Result 7: Paying high wages is not profitable in MEDIUM-HT, because the average effort 
response is too weak. The modest average response reflects underlying heterogeneity among 
agents, with some responding strongly, but many exhibiting a weak or zero response. 
 
 
Figure 10: Wage-Profit Relation in High Trust Treatments 
 
Notes: The figure shows the principals’ average profit level in the high trust treatments 
for different actual wage levels in contracting environments WEAK, MEDIUM and 
STRONG. The figure excludes the final five periods in contracting environment 
STRONG to show the relations absent the end-game effect. The figure also excludes 
categories of actual wages above 70 as there are too few observations for meaningful 






Figure 11: Distributions of Agents’ Effort Choices conditional on Wage Ranges in 
the High Trust Treatments.  
 
 
4.3 Strong Contract Enforcement 
4.3.1 Aggregate wages and effort levels 
Contract enforcement opportunities are further increased in contracting environment STRONG. 
As in contracting environment MEDIUM, principals are obliged to pay the offered wages. The 
scope for enforcement is further expanded, however, because fixed identification numbers allow 
principals to condition their contract offers on signals about agents’ past effort choices.  
The left panel of Figure 7 shows actual wages in contracting environment STRONG. In 
contrast to MEDIUM, the exogenous increase in trust is associated not only with a significant but 
also with a stable increase in actual wages. Average wages are 43.3 in STRONG-HT and 17.7 in 
STRONG-LT, a difference that is highly significant (Wilcoxon rank sum test, p<0.01). Regression 
analysis confirms that the treatment difference is stable over time; there is no statistically 
significant time trend for the treatment difference in wages (see HT x Period in regressions (3) and 
(4) in Table A1 in the Appendix).  
Notably, wages are similar in the case of low trust, regardless of strength of contract 
enforcement, whereas the same is not true for high trust. The average wages in STRONG-LT and 
MEDIUM-LT are not significantly different (17.7 vs. 16.5, Wilcoxon rank sum test, p=0.81) and 
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remain similar throughout the 15 periods of the experiment. By contrast, while wages are initially 
only slightly lower in MEDIUM-HT than in STRONG-HT, the gap between these treatments 
strongly increases over time because wages in MEDIUM-HT are steadily declining. Regression 
analysis shows that the overall impact of the exogenous trust increase on wages is significantly 
larger in contracting environment STRONG than in MEDIUM (see the interaction term HT x 
STRONG in regression (2) of Table A3 in the Appendix; p<0.07).15 We summarize this 
observation in our next result.  
Turning to agent behavior, the left panel of Figure 8 shows the average effort levels over 
time in contracting environment STRONG. The figure reveals that effort is substantially higher in 
STONG-HT than in STONG-LT. Average effort is 5.5 in STONG-HT and 3.3 in STONG-LT, a 
difference that is highly significant (Wilcoxon rank sum test, p<0.01). The difference is stable over 
the course of the experiment, except for an end-game effect that emerges in the final periods.16 
To check whether the decline in effort towards the end of the game (i.e., in periods 11-15) 
is indeed an effect tied to the end of the game, as opposed to a time trend in the effect of high trust 
that happens to start after 10 periods, we conducted two markets of a control treatment, labeled 
STRONG-HT-Long. Treatment STRONG-HT-Long is identical to treatment STONG-HT, except 
that it lasted 25 periods rather than 15 periods. Figure 12 shows that effort remains high for 10 
additional periods in STRONG-HT-Long, and starts to decline only as this longer game 
approaches its end. Increasing the length of the game thus extends the length of the stable effect 
of high trust, and moves the decline in effort to the periods near the end of the longer game. Note 
that treatment STRONG-HT-Long replicates the high level of efficiency observed in STRONG-
HT. Average effort in STRONG-HT-Long is 5.6, which is almost identical to (and not significantly 
different from) the average effort of 5.5 in STRONG-HT. A regression analysis confirms that, 
excluding the end-game effect for effort, there is no statistically significant time trend for the 
treatment difference in effort levels (see the near-zero coefficient of HT x Period in regression (4) 
                                                 
15 If, instead of examining the average wage difference between STRONG-HT and MEDIUM-HT 
over all periods, we restrict attention to periods after the initial learning phase of principals in 
MEDIUM (restricting to 6-10 or 6-15), the wage difference becomes significant at p < 0.02 for 
both time intervals (based on panel regressions of wage on treatment dummy with random effects 
on principals and clustering on sessions).  
16 Such effects are a common feature of finitely repeated game environments, with some agents 
who display high effort in pre-final periods switching to minimal effort in the final periods when 
future interactions are no longer possible (see, e.g., Brown et al., 2004).  
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in Table A2 in the Appendix). We summarize these effects of exogenous trust on wages and effort 
in the following result: 
 
Result 8: (a) Under strong contract enforcement, the principals pay substantially 
higher wages in the high-trust than in the low-trust environment. This wage 
difference is stable over time and, after the initial periods, significantly larger 
then the wage difference under medium contract enforcement. Wage levels are 
similar over time for strong and medium contract enforcement if trust is low. (b) 
The large positive effect of the exogenous trust increase on wages is associated 
with a large effort increase. Principals in STONG-HT offer high wages and end 
up receiving high effort on average. Principals in STRONG-LT, by contrast, pay 
low wages and end up receiving low effort on average. 
 
Figure 12: Robustness Check Verifying End-Game Effect in Final Periods of STRONG-HT 
 
Notes: Average effort levels are more volatile over the course of the experiment in STRONG-HT-Long than 
in STRONG-HT because we conducted only two markets in STRONG-HT-Long, not five as in STRONG-HT.  
 
Comparing the effect of the exogenous trust increase in contracting environment STRONG 
and MEDIUM, we find that the difference in the average effort between STRONG-HT and 
STRONG-LT (2.1) is larger than the difference between MEDIUM-HT and MEDIUM-LT (1.4). 
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Regression analysis confirms that the effect of trust is significantly larger in contracting 
environment STRONG than in MEDIUM (see the interaction term HT x Strong in regression (4) 
of Table A3, which excludes the end-game effect; p<0.04). This stronger impact of trust on effort 
levels explains the larger impact of trust on gains from trade in STRONG compared to MEDIUM. 
 
4.3.2 Screening strategies 
These findings raise the question, what is the mechanism underlying the higher wages and efforts 
in STRONG-HT, compared to MEDIUM-HT? And, why do principals in STRONG-LT behave 
similar to MEDIUM-LT? We hypothesize that principals in STRONG-HT are optimistic about the 
prevalence of agents who reciprocate higher wages with higher effort, and use the richer 
contracting environment to screen for such agents. For example, principals could pay medium 
wages in initial interactions with agents, and based on a positive signal, continue the relationship 
with similar or even higher wages. If this screening is successful, principals in STRONG-HT could 
selectively pay high wages only to agents who respond strongly, thus potentially making high 
wages profitable, unlike in MEDIUM-HT. In STRONG-LT, principals may be too pessimistic 
about the prevalence of agents who respond to high wages with high effort, and therefore eschew 
screening, and just pay low wages and elicit low efforts, similar to MEDIUM-LT.  
A precondition for screening to be a meaningful strategy is heterogeneity in how agents 
respond to a given wage. We have already seen in MEDIUM-HT how agents respond when wages 
are exogenous to agent type by construction: For low wages almost all agents respond with low 
effort, but for high and medium wages there is substantial heterogeneity (top panels of Figure 11). 
An implication of this heterogeneity is that there may be a value to principals in STRONG-HT of 
screening, and assigning wages endogenously based on signals about agent behavior. Furthermore, 
the way to identify agents who will reciprocate is to pay medium or high wages, because for low 
wages almost all agents choose low effort. Notably, screening with high wages may be riskier than 
using medium wages.  
Looking at the wage offers of principals in STRONG-HT in initial interactions with agents, 
and in later interactions, we find behavior consistent with such screening strategies. Principals in 
STRONG-HT tend to choose medium wages right from the outset in initial interactions with 
agents, on average paying a wage of 41. If the principal seeks out the same agent again—a sign of 
a successful previous interaction—the average wage tends to be even higher, 50 on average, so 
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moving into the range of high wages. Regressions confirm that in STRONG-HT wages are 
significantly higher in later (private offer) interactions with an agent than in the initial interaction 
(p<0.01).17 This pattern is consistent with principals moving to high wages once they have seen 
positive signals. In STRONG-LT, by contrast, principals start with low wages in initial 
interactions, 13 on average. If principals in STRONG-LT interact with the same agent again, the 
average wage is higher, 21, but still in the low range, and regressions show that the difference in 
this case is not statistically significant. It makes sense that principals in STRONG-LT do not try 
to screen with medium or high level wages, if they are pessimistic about the prevalence of agents 
who respond reciprocally. 
The tendency for principals in STRONG-HT to pay medium wages in initial interactions, 
when they do not know anything about an agent, and high wages only after positive signals, is 
apparent also in the distributions of effort choices conditional on wage ranges. As shown in the 
middle bottom panel of Figure 11, there is substantial heterogeneity in agent effort choice when 
principals choose to pay medium wages in STRONG-HT (the figure excludes the end game 
periods so this heterogeneity is not driven by end-game effects). Indeed, principals face a similar 
heterogeneity as what is observed for such wages in MEDIUM-HT. For high wages, however, 
there is a very different pattern in STRONG compared to MEDIUM (compare top and bottom 
right-hand panels of Figure 11): In STRONG-HT, when principals choose to pay high wages, 
efforts are almost uniformly high, with 88 percent of efforts being 6 or higher, and the unique 
mode at maximum effort of 9. This contrasts with MEDIUM-HT, where principals who pay high 
wages without the possibility of screening face the full range of effort outcomes, and frequently 
experience rather low effort levels. Regressions confirm that effort levels are significantly higher 
for high wages in STRONG-HT versus MEDIUM-HT (p<0.001).18 Turning to low wages in 
STRONG-HT, we see that effort levels are almost always low (left-hand bottom panel of Figure 
11). This is the main type of wage paid by principals in STRONG-LT, and in STRONG-LT the 
                                                 
17 We regress wages on a dummy variable for later interactions using a private offer, with the 
omitted category being initial interactions (with private or public offer). The dummy variable is 
statistically significant. Estimation method is panel regression with random effects on principals, 
and boostrapped standard errors clustering on session. 
18 Results are based on regressing effort on a treatment dummy for STRONG, conditioning on 
wage greater than 50 (random effects on principal with boostrapped standard errors clustering on 
market session). The coefficient on the treatment dummy is large and significant at the one-percent 
level whether or not we include periods 11 to 15 for STRONG.  
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effort response is similarly low.19 This helps explain why principals in STRONG-LT experience 
low effort levels, and why outcomes are similar to MEDIUM-LT, where principals also mainly 
pay low wages. 
There is also direct evidence that principals in the STRONG-HT condition contract terms 
on past signals, consistent with screening for agents who choose high efforts in response to high 
wages. Specifically, if we regress the probability that an agent is “fired” (i.e., does not receive a 
repeat offer) on the previous period’s effort signal (controlling for previous wage), in STRONG-
HT we find that a negative effort signal increases the probability of “firing” by 27 percentage 
points (p<0.01).  Likewise, among those who are rehired conditional on a negative effort signal 
(i.e, realization of the low value level) in t-1, the probability of a lower wage offer increases by 16 
percentage points (p<0.01).20  
A sign that these strategies allow principals in STRONG-HT to be successful in screening 
would be a stronger relationship of efforts to wage offers in STRONG-HT compared to MEDIUM-
HT. As seen in Figure 9, the effort-wage relation is in fact steeper in STRONG-HT than in 
MEDIUM-HT, and corresponding regressions confirm that the difference is statistically 
significant (see the interaction term Actual wage x STRONG in regression (1) in Table A4 in the 
appendix; p<0.05).21 This again suggests that when principals pay high wages in STRONG-HT, 
which we have seen tends to be in later interactions with an agent after positive signals, they are 
successfully targeting agents who respond with high effort levels, and avoiding agents who choose 
low efforts.22  
                                                 
19 For low wages average effort is approximately 2 in both STRONG-HT and STRONG-LT, and 
there is no statistically significant difference (regression of effort on a treatment dummy for HT, 
conditional on contract enforcement being strong and wage less than 25; random effects on 
principals with bootstrapped standard errors clustering on market). 
20 These results are based on a linear probability model with random effects for the principals, 
clustering on sessions and bootstrapped standard errors. If we use, instead, a probit specification 
we find very similar effects.  
21 Results are similarly significant if we include the end-game periods 11 to 15 for STRONG (see 
regression (2) in Table A4).  
22 Note that the end-game effect in STRONG-HT suggests that some agents who act reciprocal in 
pre-final periods start acting selfish at the end of the game. Thus, screening in pre-final periods 
may not be fully distinguishing agents with intrinsic reciprocity preferences from selfish agents 
who strategically imitate these types. Regardless, it can still be beneficial for principals to identify 




The stronger relationship of effort to wages in STRONG-HT means that paying high wages 
could be profitable. As seen in Figure 10, profits are in fact increasing in wages in STRONG-HT, 
while in MEDIUM-HT they are decreasing in wages. Corresponding regressions confirm that the 
profit response to wage increases is significantly better in STRONG-HT compared to MEDIUM-
HT (see the interaction term Actual wage x STRONG in regressions (3) in Table A4 in the 
appendix; p<0.05).23 Thus, in contrast to MEDIUM-HT, principals in STRONG-HT can gain from 
paying high wages, generating high efforts and high gains from trade. We summarize these 
findings in our next result.  
 
Result 9: (a) Under strong contract enforcement high initial trust leads principals 
to  engage in screening strategies to identify agents who respond strongly to high 
wages. These screening strategies are successful in that there is a stronger 
relationship between effort and wages compared to medium contract enforcement, 
which makes paying high wages more profitable. (b) With low initial trust, 
principals in strong contract enforcement do not try to screen for agents who 
respond to high wages, and pay low wages and elicit low efforts similar to 
principals in medium contract enforcement. 
 
5. Theory 
In this section, we summarize our theoretical analysis of the principal-agent market game. We aim 
at providing an explanation for our main experimental finding, i.e., for why exogenous increases 
in trust have no effect on the gains from trade in WEAK, only a temporary effect in MEDIUM and 
a stable effect in treatment STRONG. The formal analysis can be found in the Appendix. 
To keep the analysis tractable, the game that we solve is a simplified version of the game 
used in the experiment. We model contracting environment WEAK as a one-shot simultaneous-
move game between one principal, who chooses a wage, and one agent, who chooses an effort 
level. The game is further simplified by omitting the contract offer stage, which is pure cheap talk, 
and by assuming that all actions are binary. The principal is assumed to be profit-maximizing, 
                                                 
23 Results are statistically significant whether or not we include the end-game periods for STRONG 
(see Table A4 in the appendix). 
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while the agent can be either a selfish or a reciprocal type, but this type is unobservable to the 
principal.24 Only reciprocal types would find it optimal to respond to a high wage with high effort 
in a one-shot interaction. However, since moves are simultaneous in contracting environment 
WEAK, there is a unique equilibrium in which wage and effort are always low. Importantly, this 
unique outcome is independent of the principal’s belief about the share of reciprocal types in the 
agent population. Hence, even when our historical examples about the differential trustworthiness 
of agents in LT and HT changed a principal’s belief about the share of reciprocal types, we predict 
that this has no effect on equilibrium play, in line with our experimental finding that there is no 
difference between WEAK-LT and WEAK-HT. 
We model contracting environment MEDIUM as a one-shot sequential-move game, where 
the principal first chooses a binding wage and the agent responds by choosing a effort after 
observing that wage. A reciprocal agent then indeed responds to a high wage with high effort, 
while a selfish type always responds with low effort. Since the agent’s type is not observable to 
the principal when she makes her wage offer, her belief about the share of reciprocal types 
determines whether she wants to offer the low or the high wage. We impose the assumption that 
the share of reciprocal agents is not too large, so that offering the high wage is less profitable than 
offering a low wage – an assumption that is in line with the empirical evidence in MEDIUM.25 
Hence, there is again a unique equilibrium in contracting environment MEDIUM, in which wage 
and effort are always low, in line with what we observe in treatment MEDIUM-LT. Now assume 
that the historical example about high trustworthiness of the agents in treatment MEDIUM-HT 
initially renders the principals’ beliefs about the share of reciprocal agents more optimistic. The 
principals would then find it optimal to offer the high wage, in expectation that it will be rewarded 
with high effort sufficiently often to be profitable. It takes some time for them to learn that the 
high wage is actually not reciprocated frequently enough to be profitable, generating a slow 
                                                 
24 One could assume that there is also a positive fraction of reciprocal principals but because 
preferences for reciprocal behavior matter mainly for second movers (i.e., agents) we assume 
selfish principals. Reciprocity may provide an additional reason for the principal to pay a high 
wage in the second period only if the stochastic signal indicates that the agent is a reciprocal type. 
However, we show below that this is also an equilibrium strategy for a selfish principal. 
25 The slope of the relationship between average effort and offered wages is not steep enough in 
this treatment to generate a positive slope between profits and offered wages. In fact, the relation 
between average profits and offered wages is negative in MEDIUM.  
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learning dynamics towards the actual equilibrium, exactly in line with the transient effect of the 
high trust condition that we observe in treatment MEDIUM. 
Finally, we model contracting environment STRONG as a repeated sequential-move game. 
An essential feature of the experimental setting is the finite repetition of the stage game, coupled 
with an excess supply of agents. This allows principals to rehire or fire agents conditional on the 
stochastic outcome of their earlier interaction. We capture the dynamic interaction with just two 
periods. The feature of excess supply of agents is modelled by having one principal and two agents. 
With repeated interaction, the game exhibits coexistence of a low-trust and a high-trust sequential 
equilibrium for a large range of parameters, including parameters that closely resemble the payoff 
structure in the experiment. 
The low-trust equilibrium replicates the outcome of the one-shot interaction. If the principal 
believes that agents will provide only low effort, she initially offers the low wage to one of the 
agents, and both types of that agent respond with low effort. The subsequent stochastic realization 
of the value is therefore not informative about the agent’s type. As a consequence, the principal 
again offers the low wage in the second period, and both types of the agent respond with low effort. 
A reciprocal agent cannot signal his type by a first-period deviation from equilibrium because the 
effort choice is not directly observable to the principal. Thus, the low-trust equilibrium is a pooling 
equilibrium in which gift-exchange between the principal and the reciprocal types does not 
materialize. 
In the high-trust equilibrium, the principal initially trusts an agent of unknown type. That is, 
she pays the high wage. A selfish type responds with low effort but a reciprocal type responds with 
high effort. The principal’s belief that the agent is a reciprocal type declines if she receives the low 
value. She will then not offer the high wage again in the second period. A realized high value, by 
contrast, constitutes a positive signal about the type of the agent. Given the positively updated 
belief, the principal’s expected profit is maximized by offering the high wage again to the same 
agent. A selfish type has no incentive to mimic a reciprocal type because he does not obtain the 
additional intrinsic benefit from responding to a high wage with high effort. Thus, the high-trust 
equilibrium is a separating equilibrium, where the initial trusting behavior of the principal serves 
to stochastically screen reciprocal types from selfish types. 
We interpret the historical information about agents’ trustworthiness used in the experiment 
as a device that selects between these multiple equilibria. The predictions of the high-trust and the 
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low-trust equilibrium are indeed in line with the experimental findings of higher wages and higher 
effort in STRONG-HT compared to STRONG-LT.  
More specifically, consider the low-trust equilibrium first. The offered wage and the returned 
effort are predicted to be low in both periods on the equilibrium path, as confirmed by the 
experimental results in treatment STRONG-LT. Furthermore, if the principal trembled and offered 
the high wage in the first period, then both types of the agent would still respond with low effort 
in that equilibrium. This is sustained by the correct off-equilibrium belief that the principal 
subsequently reacts to a realized high value (which is uninformative because both types behave in 
the same way) by not rehiring the agent. The agent’s off-equilibrium behavior thus confirms the 
flat wage-effort reaction as induced by the historical example in treatment STRONG-LT. 
Consider the high-trust equilibrium next. The high first-period wage elicits an average effort 
strictly above the low level, as confirmed by our results in treatment STRONG-HT. If the principal 
trembled and offered the low wage instead, both types of the agent would respond with low effort 
in this equilibrium. This confirms the principal’s belief in a positive wage-effort reaction as 
induced by the historical example in treatment STRONG-HT. A response of effort to wage can 
also be observed on the equilibrium path of the high-trust equilibrium. Depending on the stochastic 
realization of the value, the principal offers either the high or the low wage in the second period, 
and the induced expected effort is larger in the former case than in the latter. 
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper studies the interplay between trust and the strength of contract enforcement for the 
realization of gains from trade by systematically varying both factors independently. It is well-
understood that informational constraints and weak judicial systems render contract enforcement 
imperfect. People may then only be willing to interact and realize gains from trade if they trust that 
their contract partner will not behave opportunistically. By contrast, little appears to be known 
about how trust affects the impact of contract enforcement on gains from trade and how contract 
enforcement shapes the causal impact of trust.  
A better understanding of the interplay of trust and the strength of contract enforcement is 
important for designing policies aimed at improving economic performance. If trust and contract 
enforcement were substitutes, policies could be effective if they focused solely on, say, improving 
the judicial system in order to enable trading partners to better enforce their contracts—even if 
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levels of trust remained low. Policies could be equally effective if they focused solely on, say, 
advertising role models of trustful business relations in order to move a society out of a low-trust 
trap—even if the judicial system remained weak. Our results suggest, however, that such 
independent improvements along only one dimension – either only trust or only contract 
enforcement – may not work. We find, in particular, that improvements in the strength of contract 
enforcement have no or only limited effects on gains from trade when individuals are in our low-
trust environment. Likewise, the results indicate that increases in exogenous trust have no or only 
a transitory impact on gains from trade in our weak and medium contract environment, 
respectively. In contrast, under strong contract enforcement trust increases have a large impact, 
and under high trust improvements in contract enforcement have also a large effect on the gains 
from trade. The strong complementarity between trust and the strength of contract enforcement 
indicates that simultaneous improvements along both dimensions may well be a preferred policy 
tool.  
By documenting empirically that trust and contract enforcement can be complements, and 
by identifying the mechanisms underlying this complementarity, we also contribute to 
understanding the conditions under which trust does and does not exert a causal effect on the gains 
from trade.  
As a general implication, research on the determinants of economic performance may benefit 
by focusing more on interactions between separate factors of influences. Controlling for trust and 
contract enforcement environments, but not for their interaction, might yield results that obfuscate 
the real effects. Similar issues may arise for the interaction between other institutional factors and 
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Online Appendix  
A. Additional Tables 
 
Table A1: Actual Wage Levels as Function of Trust and Time Period in the Different 
Contracting Environments 
 
  WEAK MEDIUM STRONG 
 All periods All periods All periods Periods < 11 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
HT 8.09** 23.06*** 26.83*** 25.19*** 
 [3.33] [2.04] [3.42] [3.19] 
Period -0.64*** -0.02 -0.01 -0.19 
 [0.18] [0.06] [0.18] [0.28] 
HT x Period -0.61* -0.71** -0.14 0.21 
 [0.32] [0.32] [0.25] [0.36] 
Constant 13.58*** 16.66*** 17.69*** 18.44*** 
 [1.90] [1.43] [2.46] [2.43] 
Observations 1031 1046 1042 694 
 
Notes: Panel regression estimates with random effects for principals. 
Bootstrapped standard errors clustered on markets (30 clusters) shown in 
brackets. Columns (1) to (3) present regressions for the three contracting 
environments WEAK, MEDIUM, and STRONG, respectively, using all 
periods. Column (4) shows results for STRONG excluding the final five 
periods to eliminate the end-game effect. The regression for each column 
only uses data from the respective contracting environment. The omitted 
category in each case is the respective low-trust environment. “HT” is a 
dummy variable indicating the respective high-trust environment. 
“Period” takes on values 1 to 15, or 1 to 10 in Colum (4) indicating the 







Table A2: Effort Levels as Function of Trust and Time Period in the Different Contracting 
Environments 
 
  WEAK MEDIUM STRONG 
 All periods All periods All periods Periods < 11 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
HT 0.76 2.05*** 3.07*** 2.55*** 
 [0.50] [0.50] [0.37] [0.42] 
Period -0.11*** -0.00 -0.04 0.01 
 [0.03] [0.02] [0.04] [0.04] 
HT x Period -0.08** -0.08*** -0.12** -0.01 
 [0.04] [0.02] [0.05] [0.08] 
Constant 3.42*** 2.29*** 3.59*** 3.35*** 
 [0.21] [0.30] [0.20] [0.23] 
Observations 1031 1046 1042 694 
 
Notes: Panel regression estimates with random effects for principals. 
Bootstrapped standard errors clustered on markets (30 clusters) shown 
in brackets. Columns (1) to (3) present regressions for the three 
contracting environments WEAK, MEDIUM, and STRONG, 
respectively, using all periods. Column (4) shows results for STRONG 
excluding the final five periods to eliminate the end-game effect. The 
regression for each column only uses data from the respective 
contracting environment. The omitted category in each case is the 
respective low-trust environment. “HT” is a dummy variable indicating 
the respective high-trust environment. “Period” takes on values 1 to 15, 
or 1 to 10 in Colum (4) indicating the respective period. ***, **, * 






Table A3: The Impact of Trust and Contractual Environments on Actual Wages and Effort 
Levels 
 
  Actual wage Effort 
 All periods Periods < 11 All periods Periods < 11 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
HT 17.40*** 17.40*** 1.40*** 1.40*** 
 [3.03] [3.03] [0.44] [0.44] 
WEAK -8.06*** -8.06*** 0.23 0.23 
 [1.22] [1.22] [0.24] [0.24] 
STRONG 1.10 0.94 1.03*** 1.13*** 
 [2.65] [2.67] [0.32] [0.25] 
HT x WEAK -14.24*** -14.24*** -1.32** -1.32** 
 [3.35] [3.35] [0.52] [0.52] 
HT x STRONG 8.33* 8.89* 0.75 1.11** 
 [5.02] [4.91] [0.58] [0.55] 
Constant 16.49*** 16.49*** 2.28*** 2.28*** 
 [0.95] [0.95] [0.19] [0.19] 
Observations 3119 2771 3119 2771 
 
Notes: Panel regression estimates with random effects for principals. 
Bootstrapped standard errors clustered on markets (30 clusters) shown in 
brackets. Columns (1) and (2) present regressions explaining actual wages as 
a function of contracting and trust environment. The estimations use data 
from all three contracting environments with LT x MEDIUM as the omitted 
category. “HT” is a dummy variable indicating the respective high-trust 
environment. Thus, HT measures the impact of the high-trust environment 
under medium contract enforcement. WEAK measures the impact of weak 
contract enforcement relative to MEDIUM in the low-trust environment and 
STRONG measures the effect of strong contract enforcement relative to 
MEDIUM in the low-trust environment. HT x WEAK and HT x STRONG 
give the differential effect of high trust in these respective contracting 
environments relative to the impact of high trust in MEDIUM. Columns (2) 
and (4) only use periods 1 to 10 for contracting environment STRONG to 
eliminate the end-game effect that is present in that environment. In columns 
(3) and (4) the dependent variable is actual effort levels. ***, **, * denote 






Table A4: Relationships of Effort and Profits to Actual Wages in the High Trust Treatments 
 
 Effort Profit of principal 
 All periods Periods < 11 All periods Periods < 11 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Actual wage 0.09*** 0.09*** -0.25*** -0.25*** 
 [0.01] [0.01] [0.05] [0.05] 
WEAK 1.66*** 1.68*** 14.74*** 14.74*** 
 [0.30] [0.30] [2.24] [2.26] 
STRONG -0.02 0.09 -5.07 -5.21 
 [0.31] [0.50] [6.55] [8.98] 
Actual wage x WEAK -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.71*** -0.71*** 
 [0.01] [0.01] [0.11] [0.11] 
Actual wage x STRONG 0.02** 0.03** 0.33*** 0.42** 
 [0.01] [0.01] [0.13] [0.17] 
Constant 0.80*** 0.78*** 17.95*** 17.95*** 
 [0.15] [0.16] [1.76] [1.77] 
Observations 1551 1379 1551 1379 
 
Notes: Panel regression estimates with random effects for principals. Bootstrapped standard errors 
clustered on markets (15 clusters) shown in brackets. Columns (1) and (2) present regressions 
explaining effort levels as a function of actual wages and contracting environment. In columns (3) 
and (4) the dependent variable is profit levels of principals. The estimations use data from the high 
trust conditions of all three contracting environments with MEDIUM as the omitted category. 
WEAK is a dummy variable indicating the weak contracting environment, and STRONG indicates 
the strong contracting environment. “Actual wage” gives the relationship of the dependent variable 
to actual wages in MEDIUM. Actual  wage x WEAK and Actual wage x STRONG give the 
differential relationship of the dependent variable to higher actual wages in these respective 
contracting environments relative to the relationship in MEDIUM. The sample excludes outlier 
wages above 70. Columns (2) and (4) only use periods 1 to 10 for contracting environment 
STRONG to check robustness to eliminating the end-game effect that is present in that 






B. Game-Theoretic Analysis 
The games analyzed in this section are simpler than the games played in the experiment, but they 
capture their essential features. We model contracting environment WEAK as a one-shot 
simultaneous-move game between a principal, who chooses a wage, and an agent, who chooses a 
effort level. We model contracting environment MEDIUM as a one-shot sequential-move game 
where the principal first choses the wage, and the agent chooses the effort level after observing 
that wage. We model contracting environment STRONG as a simplified dynamic interaction with 
two periods, and we capture the excess supply of agents by considering one principal and two 
agents. Throughout, we simplify the strategy spaces by assuming that all actions are binary. 
Furthermore, the principal is assumed to be profit-maximizing, while the agents can be either 
selfish types or reciprocal types. We work with sequential equilibrium as our solution concept.  
 
Stage Game Payoffs 
The principal chooses a wage 𝑤 ∈ 𝑤 ,𝑤 , where 0 𝑤 𝑤 . The agent exerts effort 𝑒 ∈
𝑒 , 𝑒  where 0 𝑒 𝑒 1, to produce a good of uncertain quality. The good is either 
valuable, in which case it generates a payoff of 𝑣 for the principal, or it is useless and does not 
generate any value. Effort 𝑒 is the probability that the good is valuable. Denote by 𝜔 ∈ 0,1  the 
state of the world describing whether the good is valuable (𝜔 1) or not (𝜔 0). The agent's 
cost of providing low effort is normalized to zero; the cost of providing high effort is 𝑐. Given 
actions (𝑤, 𝑒), the expected material payoffs of principal and agent are, respectively,  
𝜋 𝑤, 𝑒 𝑒𝑣 –  𝑤  and  𝜋 𝑤, 𝑒 𝑤 –
𝑒 – 𝑒
𝑒  – 𝑒
𝑐. 
We assume that 0 𝑐 𝑒 𝑒 𝑣, which implies that providing the high effort is efficient. 
The principal is profit-oriented and maximizes 𝑢 𝑤, 𝑒 𝜋 𝑤, 𝑒 . The agent has a type 
𝛼 ∈ 0,𝑎 , where 0 𝑎 1, and maximizes  
𝑢 𝑤, 𝑒,𝛼 𝜋 𝑤, 𝑒 𝛼|𝜋 𝑤, 𝑒 𝜋 𝑤, 𝑒 |. 
Type 𝛼 0 is selfish and cares only about own material payoff. Type 𝛼 𝑎 is inequity-averse, 
where the symmetric formulation of inequity-aversion is the simplest way of modelling a 
reciprocal motive.26  
                                                 
26 To keep the analysis simple and tractable we use inquity averse preferences to generate 
reciprocal agent behavior. In principle, one could also model the motive for reciprocal effort 
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Let 𝑒∗ 𝑤,𝛼 ∈ argmax  𝑢 𝑤, 𝑒,𝛼  denote a best response of the 𝛼-type agent to wage 
𝑤. For the selfish type, we obtain 𝑒∗ 𝑤 , 0 𝑒∗ 𝑤 , 0 𝑒 . The following assumption makes 
sure that 𝑒∗ 𝑤 , 𝑎 𝑒  and 𝑒∗ 𝑤 ,𝑎 𝑒 , so that the reciprocal type would indeed behave in 
a trustworthy way. 
 
Assumption 1 (Trustworthiness) 
𝑢 𝑤 , 𝑒 , 𝑎   𝑢 𝑤 , 𝑒 ,𝑎   and  𝑢 𝑤 , 𝑒 ,𝑎  𝑢 𝑤 , 𝑒 ,𝑎 . 
 
Suppose the prior probability of the agent being reciprocal is given by 0 𝜆 1. We will 
be interested in environments where gift-exchange does not arise in the one-shot sequential-move 
game, when the principal’s belief about the share of reciprocal types is given by the prior. 
However, gift-exchange should become possible in the dynamic sequential-move game, where the 
principal might be able to update her belief about the agent. Suppose there was an initial stage at 
which a selfish agent chooses 𝑒  while an inequity-averse agent chooses 𝑒 . Then, if the good 
turns out to be of high value, a simple application of Bayes’ rule implies that the principal’s 
posterior belief about the agent being a reciprocal type would increase to  
𝜆
𝑒
𝜆 𝑒 1 𝜆 𝑒
. 
The following assumption implies that this increase would make the principal change her behavior. 
 
Assumption 2 (Value of Information) 
𝜆𝑣
𝑤  𝑤
𝑒   𝑒
𝜆
𝑒





                                                 
choices with alternative social preference models but this would typically render the analysis more 
complicated. Note that our agent dislikes inequality in expected payoffs. One could also model 
aversion to the expectation of inequality in ex-post payoffs, after the stochastic value of the good 
has realized.  
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Contracting Environment WEAK 
Suppose the principal and the agent interact only once and choose their actions simultaneously. It 
is straightforward to see that this game has a unique equilibrium in which wage and effort are low. 
For the principal, paying the low wage is a dominant strategy when choices are simultaneous, 
because her wage offer cannot affect the effort chosen by the agent. Both types of the agent then 
find it optimal to choose low effort, under Assumption 1. We summarize this in the following 
proposition, the formal proof of which is left to the reader. 
 
Proposition 1. Under Assumption 1, the one-shot simultaneous-move game has a 
unique sequential equilibrium. In this equilibrium, the principal pays the low wage 
and both types of the agent respond with low effort. 
 
Contracting Environment MEDIUM 
Now suppose the principal and the agent interact once but choose their actions sequentially. The 
wage offered by the principal becomes observable before the agent makes a choice, so that the 
principal could affect the effort chosen by the agent. Under Assumption 2, the principal will still 
not find it optimal to offer the high wage. This is summarized in the following proposition, the 
proof of which is again left to the reader. 
 
Proposition 2. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the one-shot sequential-move game has a 
unique sequential equilibrium. In this equilibrium, the principal pays the low wage 
and both types of the agent respond with low effort. 
 
Note, however, that this result depends on the prior belief of the principal about the agent’s 
type being pessimistic enough, as embodied by Assumption 2. Suppose an intervention like the 
high trustworthiness example in our experiment initially distorts upwards the beliefs of some 
principals about the share 𝜆 of trustworthy types. With sequential moves, we could then expect 
some principals to offer high wages initially. It takes some time for them to learn that the high 
wage is not reciprocated frequently enough to be profitable, generating a slow learning dynamics 





Contracting Environment STRONG 
Now suppose the interaction is repeated and the principal can adjust her contract offer over time. 
We consider the following simplified dynamic game between the principal and two agents:  
1. The principal chooses wage 𝑤 . 
2. Nature determines agent 1’s type 𝛼  (𝛼 𝑎 with independent probability 𝜆). 
3. Agent 1 chooses effort 𝑒 . 
4. Nature determines the state 𝜔  (𝜔 1 with independent probability 𝑒 ). 
5. The principal chooses whether to keep agent 1 (𝑘 1) or to fire her and hire agent 2 instead 
(𝑘 0). The principal also chooses wage 𝑤  for the second period. 
6. Nature determines agent 2’s type 𝛼  (𝛼 𝑎 with independent probability 𝜆). 
7. The hired agent chooses effort 𝑒 . 
8. Nature determines the state 𝜔  (𝜔 1 with independent probability 𝑒 ). 
 
For notational simplicity, we assume that nature determines agent 2’s type 𝛼  even if the 
agent is not hired in the second period. The terminal nodes of the dynamic game are then given by 
𝑡 𝑤 ,𝛼 , 𝑒 ,𝜔 ,𝑘,𝑤 ,𝛼 , 𝑒 ,𝜔 . The players’ payoffs are  
𝑈 𝑡  𝑢 𝑤 ,𝜔   𝑢 𝑤 ,𝜔 , 
𝑈 𝑡 𝑢 𝑤 , 𝑒 ,𝛼   𝑘𝑢 𝑤 , 𝑒 ,𝛼 , 
𝑈 𝑡  1 𝑘 𝑢 𝑤 , 𝑒 ,𝛼 . 
Note that we assume here that the inequity-averse agents compare themselves only with the 
principal, separately period by period, whenever they interact. 
Concerning the information structure, we assume that an agent’s type and effort choice is 
observable only to the agent herself, while everything else is observable to all players.27 A (pure) 
strategy of the principal prescribes the wage to be chosen in the root of the game, 𝑠 ∅ ∈
𝑤 ,𝑤 , as well as for each observed history (𝑤 ,𝜔 ) a hiring decision and the wage offered in 
the second period, 𝑠 𝑤 ,𝜔 ∈ 0,1 𝑤 ,𝑤 . A strategy of agent 1 prescribes an effort to be 
chosen in the first period for each observed wage-type combination, 𝑠 𝑤  ,𝛼 ∈ 𝑒 , 𝑒 , and 
                                                 
27 We could also assume that wage offers are only observable to the currently hired agent, and/or 
that the realized value of the good is observable only to the principal. This would complicate the 
notation of beliefs, but we would still obtain the equilibrium outcomes derived below. 
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an effort to be chosen conditional on all observables in case she is hired again in the second period, 
𝑠 𝑤 ,𝛼 , 𝑒 ,𝜔 , 1,𝑤 ∈  𝑒 , 𝑒 . Finally, a strategy of agent 2 prescribes a effort to be chosen 
conditional on all observables in case she is hired in the second period, 𝑠 𝑤 ,𝜔 , 0,𝑤 ,𝛼 ∈
 𝑒 , 𝑒 . For each of the observable histories at which a player acts, she maintains a probabilistic 
belief over the nodes in the corresponding information set, i.e., a belief about the earlier 
unobservable actions that led to this information set. 
In a first step, we describe conditions under which the game admits a sequential equilibrium 
that replicates the one-shot equilibrium outcome: The principal initially pays the low wage and 
both types of the first agent respond with low effort; the principal then always fires the first agent 
and offers the low wage to the second agent, who responds with low effort. We refer to such an 
equilibrium as a low-trust equilibrium. It can exist if the principal correctly believes that a high 
wage would not elicit high effort from any type of the first agent, and hence would also not 
facilitate learning about that agent’s type. It will turn out that the binding constraint for this 
construction is the reciprocal first agent’s incentive not to respond to a high wage with high effort. 
The following assumption makes sure that this constraint can be satisfied. 
 
Assumption 3 (Low-Trust Incentive-Compatibility) 
𝑒 𝑒 𝑢 𝑤 , 𝑒 ,𝑎 𝑢 𝑤 , 𝑒 ,𝑎 𝑢 𝑤 , 𝑒 ,𝑎 . 
 
We can now state the following result. 
 
Proposition 3. Under Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 the dynamic game has a low-trust 
sequential equilibrium. 
 
Proof: We first characterize agent 2’s strategy in any sequential equilibrium. After observing any 
history 𝑤 ,𝜔 , 0,𝑤 ,𝛼  she entertains a belief about (𝛼 , 𝑒 ), which must be consistent with the 
requirements imposed by sequential equilibrium. However, her optimal behavior does not depend 
on these beliefs. Under Assumption 1, we always obtain the unique sequentially rational choice 
𝑠 𝑤 ,𝜔 , 0,𝑤 ,𝛼 𝑒∗ 𝑤 ,𝛼 . We next characterize agent 1’s second-period strategy in any 
sequential equilibrium. After observing any history (𝑤 ,𝛼 , 𝑒 ,𝜔 , 1,𝑤 ) she entertains a belief 
about 𝛼 , which must be consistent with the requirements imposed by sequential equilibrium. 
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However, her optimal behavior does not depend on these beliefs. Under Assumption 1, we obtain 
the unique sequentially rational choice 𝑠 𝑤 ,𝛼 , 𝑒 ,𝜔 , 1,𝑤 𝑒∗ 𝑤 ,𝛼 . 
We now subsume these choices directly into the players’ payoff functions and treat the game 
as a reduced game between the principal and agent 1. It ends in the terminal nodes ?̂?
𝑤 ,𝛼 , 𝑒 ,𝜔 ,𝑘,𝑤  with payoffs 
𝑈 ?̂?  𝑢 𝑤 ,𝜔 𝑘𝑢 𝑤 , 𝑒∗ 𝑤 ,𝛼                                                              
                                           1 𝑘 𝜆𝑢 𝑤 , 𝑒∗ 𝑤 ,𝑎 1 𝜆 𝑢 𝑤 , 𝑒∗ 𝑤 , 0 ,  
𝑈 ?̂? 𝑢 𝑤 , 𝑒 ,𝛼 𝑘𝑢 𝑤 , 𝑒∗ 𝑤 ,𝛼 ,𝛼 .                                                 
This reduced game has two proper subgames, one starting after each possible first period wage 
offer. In each of these subgames, the only non-singleton information sets are those of the principal 
when observing (𝑤 ,𝜔 ), where she entertains beliefs about (𝛼 , 𝑒 ). Since 𝑒 0 and 𝑒 1, 
these beliefs can always be determined by Bayes' rule when we start from the root of the respective 
subgame. This uniquely pins down the consistent beliefs in any sequential equilibrium. 
Consider first the subgame starting after 𝑤 𝑤 . Let the strategies in this subgame be 
given by 
𝑠 𝑤 , 0 𝑠 𝑤 , 𝑎 𝑒   and  𝑠 𝑤 , 0 𝑠 𝑤 , 1 0,𝑤 , 
i.e., both types of the first agent respond with low effort, and, irrespective of the realized value of 
the good, the principal then hires the second agent and pays the low wage. Given any observation 
of (𝑤 ,𝜔 ), the principal entertains a probabilistic belief about (𝛼 , 𝑒 ), but only the marginal 
distribution of 𝛼  matters for her sequentially rational choices (since 𝑒  is not payoff relevant 
conditional on 𝜔 , and later behavior also does not depend on 𝑒 ). Denoting the probability 
attached to 𝛼 𝑎 by 𝛽 𝑤 ,𝜔 , we obtain 𝛽 𝑤 , 0 𝛽 𝑤 , 1 𝜆 from Bayes’ rule. It 
then follows immediately from Assumptions 1 and 2 that the principal’s strategy is indeed 
sequentially rational. As for the agent, observe that deviations cannot affect the principal’s second 
period behavior. It then follows from Assumption 1 that the agent’s strategy is also sequentially 
rational. The resulting expected payoff of the principal in the root of this subgame is 𝑈
2𝑢 𝑤 , 𝑒 .  




𝑠 𝑤 , 0 𝑠 𝑤 , 𝑎 𝑒   and  𝑠 𝑤 , 0 1,𝑤 , 𝑠 𝑤 , 1 0,𝑤 , 
i.e., both types of the first agent respond with low effort and the principal always pays the low 
wage in the second period, keeping the first agent if and only if the good is of low value. We obtain 
the beliefs 𝛽 𝑤 , 0 𝛽 𝑤 , 1 𝜆. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the principal thus wants to 
pay the low wage in the second period and is indifferent between keeping and firing the agent, 
which makes her strategy sequentially rational. As for the agent, consider type 𝛼 0 first. 
Assumption 1 implies that 𝑒  maximizes her first-period payoff. Moreover, 
𝑢 𝑤 , 𝑒∗ 𝑤 , 0 , 0 𝑤 0 implies that the selfish agent (weakly) benefits from a larger 
probability of being hired again in the second period, which implies that her strategy is sequentially 
rational. Consider next type 𝛼 𝑎, who faces a trade-off between her payoff-maximizing 
response in the first period and the probability of being hired again in the second period. The 
condition for 𝑠 𝑤 , 𝑎 𝑒  to be sequentially rational is 
 
𝑢 𝑤 , 𝑒 ,𝑎 1 𝑒 𝑢 𝑤 , 𝑒∗ 𝑤 , 𝑎 ,𝑎                                              
                                                                       𝑢 𝑤 , 𝑒 ,𝑎  1 𝑒 𝑢 𝑤 , 𝑒∗ 𝑤 ,𝑎 ,𝑎 , 
which is satisfied under Assumptions 1 and 3. The resulting expected payoff of the principal in the 
root of this subgame is 𝑈 𝑢 𝑤 , 𝑒 𝑢 𝑤 , 𝑒 .  
Given the strategies and payoffs in the two subgames, it follows that 𝑠 ∅ 𝑤  is the 
sequentially rational first-period wage for the principal.                ∎ 
 
Next, we describe conditions under which the game admits an equilibrium in which gift-
exchange occurs. The principal initially pays the high wage, to which a selfish agent responds with 
low effort and a reciprocal agent responds with high effort. The principal then always keeps the 
agent but offers the high wage in the second period if and only if the good turns out to be valuable. 
Thus, the principal tries to screen the reciprocal types from the selfish types. We refer to such an 
equilibrium as a high-trust equilibrium. Several constraints have to be satisfied for this equilibrium 





Assumption 4 (High-Trust Incentive-Compatibility)  
𝑖     𝑢 𝑤 , 𝑒 , 0 𝑢 𝑤 , 𝑒 , 0 𝑒 𝑒 𝑢 𝑤 , 𝑒 , 0 𝑢 𝑤 , 𝑒 , 0 ,  
𝑖𝑖    𝑢 𝑤 , 𝑒 ,𝑎 𝑢 𝑤 , 𝑒 , 𝑎 𝑒 𝑒 𝑢 𝑤 , 𝑒 ,𝑎 𝑢 𝑤 , 𝑒 ,𝑎 ,  
𝑖𝑖𝑖   𝑢 𝑤 , 𝜆𝑒 1 𝜆 𝑒 𝜆𝑒 𝑢 𝑤 , 𝑒 1 𝜆 𝑒 𝑢 𝑤 , 𝑒   
                                                                  2 𝜆 1 𝑒 1 𝜆 1 𝑒  𝑢 𝑤 , 𝑒 .  
We can now state the following result. 
 
Proposition 4: Under Assumptions 1, 2, and 4, the dynamic game has a high-trust 
sequential equilibrium. 
 
Proof: Consider again the reduced game between the principal and agent 1 constructed in the proof 
of Proposition 3. Also, let the strategies and beliefs in the subgame starting after 𝑤 𝑤  be the 
same as in the proof of Proposition 3, i.e.,  
𝑠 𝑤 , 0 𝑠 𝑤 , 𝑎 𝑒   and  𝑠 𝑤 , 0 𝑠 𝑤 , 1 0,𝑤 , 
where 𝛽 𝑤 , 0 𝛽 𝑤 , 1 𝜆, with a resulting expected payoff for the principal in the root 
of this subgame of 𝑈 2𝑢 𝑤 , 𝑒 . 
 
Consider now the subgame starting after 𝑤 𝑤 . Let the strategies be given by  
𝑠 𝑤 , 0 𝑒 ,  𝑠 𝑤 ,𝑎 𝑒   and  𝑠 𝑤 , 0 1,𝑤 ,  𝑠 𝑤 , 1 1,𝑤 , 
i.e., the selfish agent responds with low effort and the trustworthy agent responds with high effort, 
while the principal always keeps the agent but pays the high wage in the second period only if the 
good turns out to be valuable. Given these strategies, an application of Bayes’ rule yields the 
following consistent beliefs:  
𝛽 𝑤 , 0
𝜆 1 𝑒
𝜆 1 𝑒  1 𝜆 1 𝑒
𝜆, 
𝛽 𝑤 , 1
𝜆𝑒  
𝜆𝑒 1 𝜆 𝑒
𝜆. 
Assumptions 1 and 2 now immediately imply that the principal’s strategy is sequentially 
rational. As for the agent, consider type 𝛼 0 first. The condition for 𝑠 𝑤 , 0 𝑒  to be 
sequentially rational is  
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𝑢 𝑤 , 𝑒 , 0 𝑒 𝑢 𝑤 , 𝑒∗ 𝑤 , 0 , 0 1 𝑒 𝑢 𝑤 , 𝑒∗ 𝑤 , 0 , 0                                
                     𝑢 𝑤 , 𝑒 , 0 𝑒 𝑢 𝑤 , 𝑒∗ 𝑤 , 0 ,0 1 𝑒 𝑢 𝑤 , 𝑒∗ 𝑤 , 0 ,0 , 
which is satisfied under Assumptions 1 and 4(i). Now consider type 𝛼 𝑎. The condition for 
𝑠 𝑤 ,𝑎 𝑒  to be sequentially rational is  
𝑢 𝑤 , 𝑒 ,𝑎 𝑒 𝑢 𝑤 , 𝑒∗ 𝑤 ,𝑎 ,𝑎 1 𝑒 𝑢 𝑤 , 𝑒∗ 𝑤 ,𝑎 ,𝑎                              
                       𝑢 𝑤 , 𝑒 ,𝑎 𝑒 𝑢 𝑤 , 𝑒∗ 𝑤 ,𝑎 ,𝑎 1 𝑒 𝑢 𝑤 , 𝑒∗ 𝑤 ,𝑎 ,𝑎 , 
which is satisfied under Assumptions 1 and 4(ii). The resulting expected payoff of the principal in 
the root of this subgame is 
𝑈 𝜆𝑒 𝑢 𝑤 , 1 𝑢 𝑤 , 𝑒                                 
𝜆 1 𝑒 𝑢 𝑤 , 0 𝑢 𝑤 , 𝑒              
1 𝜆 𝑒 𝑢 𝑤 , 1 𝑢 𝑤 , 𝑒              
1 𝜆 1 𝑒 𝑢 𝑤 , 0 𝑢 𝑤 , 𝑒 . 
Now consider the principal’s choice of the first-period wage. The condition 𝑈 𝑈  is 
satisfied under Assumption 4(iii), which implies that 𝑠 ∅ 𝑤  is sequentially rational for the 
principal.                       ∎ 
It remains to be shown that Assumptions 1 – 4 can be satisfied simultaneously, so that the 
low-trust and the high-trust equilibrium coexist. In fact, it can be shown that they are jointly 
satisfied by a large range of values of the underlying parameters, including values that resemble 
the payoff structure in the experiment. For instance, let 𝑣 100, 𝑐 15, 𝑤 20, 𝑤 40, 
𝑒 1/3 and 𝑒 2/3. Also choose 𝑎 0.4 and 𝜆 0.55. It is easy to show that all assumptions 
are satisfied by these parameters. It holds that all players’ expected payoffs are non-negative in 
equilibrium (even in each period separately), so that participation constraints would also be 
satisfied. 
We interpret the historical examples about agent trustworthiness in our experiment as an 
equilibrium selection device, so that the high-trust equilibrium corresponds to treatment 
STRONG-HT and the low-trust equilibrium corresponds to treatment STRONG-LT. 
Consider the low-trust equilibrium first. The offered wage and the returned effort are always 
low on the equilibrium path, in both periods. If the principal actually trembled and mistakenly 
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offered the high wage in the first period, both agent types would still respond with low effort. The 
off-equilibrium behavior thus confirms the pattern shown in the low trustworthiness example. 
Now consider the high-trust equilibrium. On the equilibrium path, the first-period wage is 
always high, 𝑤 , while the average second-period wage (across many independent repetitions of 
the game) is given by  
𝜆𝑒 1 𝜆 𝑒  𝑤 𝜆 1 𝑒 1 𝜆 1 𝑒 𝑤 , 
reflecting that the principal offers the high wage only if the first-period good turns out to be 
valuable. Hence, we predict some endgame effect in wages. As for effort, the average first-period 
effort is 𝜆𝑒 1 𝜆 𝑒  in equilibrium. The average second-period effort is 𝜆𝑒 𝑒
1 𝜆𝑒 𝑒 , reflecting that only trustworthy agents who produced a good of high value are 
induced to provide the high effort again in the second period. Hence, there should also be some 
endgame effect in effort. Notice that a response of effort to wage can be observed on the 
equilibrium path in the high-trust equilibrium. The high wage is associated with an average effort 
of 𝜆𝑒 1 𝜆 𝑒  in the first period and with an even larger average effort of ?̅?𝑒 1 ?̅? 𝑒  
in the second period, where 
?̅? 𝜆
𝑒
𝜆 𝑒 1 𝜆 𝑒
. 
By contrast, the low wage in the second period is always associated with the low effort. Similarly, 
if the principal trembled and offered the low wage in the first period, both agent types would 
respond with low effort. This confirms the responsive pattern where agents choose higher average 
effort when wages are higher, as shown in the high trustworthiness example.  
 
